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 The overall goal of this thesis is to draw some conclusions about the kinds of 
strategies and tactics that those engaging in irregular warfare should employ. Given the 
increasing number of intrastate conflicts and future U.S. involvement in 
counterinsurgency, it is important for policy makers and strategists to be clear-eyed about 
viable ways to engage in irregular war. Thus, this paper’s analysis of previous 
counterinsurgency and stability operations, and estimate of the U.S. military’s 
institutional capacity to adapt to irregular warfare could serve as a useful guide for future 
force planning.  
 The first and second chapters of this thesis examine divergent strategies in 
counterinsurgency and stability operations. Chapter One assesses whether indiscriminate 
force is strategically effective in national counterinsurgency campaigns. The findings of 
this chapter indicate that while indiscriminate force may be tactically effective in the 
near-term, indiscriminate force alone does not produce long-term success. Chapter Two 
assesses conditions for conflict and stability in Iraq, and why, despite similarly low levels 
of development and proximity to violence, some areas of Iraq are more stable than others. 
My research found the examined Shi’a and Kurdish communities in Iraq maintained 
stability as a result of ethnic homogenization and a capable local security force, rather 
than COIN and international development efforts.  
 Chapter Three examines U.S. strategic culture and the U.S. military’s ability to 
adapt to irregular warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). U.S. strategic culture 
can generally be defined as the historical tendency to focus on high intensity combat 




operational learning level and the institutional level. I concluded that although there is 
evidence that the U.S. military was adapting to irregular warfare, real institutional 
adaptation to counterinsurgency was limited by deep-rooted norms characteristic of the 
American way of war. 
 The purpose of this study is not to argue against the value of conventional military 
excellence. Tactical successes are important, but many non-lethal efforts and dynamics 
should be heavily accounted for when engaging in irregular war. The findings of this 
study offer insights to various limits, challenges, and opportunities for modern 
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 The global trend in armed conflict shifted from interstate to intrastate during the 
latter half of the 20th century. Today, non-state actors are one of the toughest challenges 
for state, regional, and global security. Despite numerous counterinsurgency campaigns 
on behalf of both domestic authorities and foreign actors and coalitions, insurgents have 
remained persistent and resilient in a growing number of intrastate conflicts. This fact 
brings to light an objective reality: many states are engaging in ineffective 
counterinsurgency operations. Consequentially, insurgent groups are continuously able to 
mass mobilize communities in an alarming capacity, while afflicted states remain unable 
to attain and maintain security and stability within their borders.  
 The first two chapters of this thesis explore divergent counterinsurgency and 
stabilization efforts. In my final chapter, I examine traditional U.S. strategic culture, and 
how the U.S. armed forces adapted to irregular warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
In the final conclusion portion of this thesis, I posit limits, challenges, and opportunities 
for future U.S. force planning to “win” irregular wars.   
 In order to understand the analyses in this paper, it is important to establish 
definitions for key terms in this paper. It is important to note that there is no universally 
accepted definitions for many of these key terms, and the differences between terms like 
indiscriminate force, indiscriminate violence, and terrorism; civil war, insurgency, 
irregular warfare, asymmetric conflict, and armed non-state rebellion; counterinsurgency 




David Ucko points out, it is more useful to group these terms not by what they are called 
but by the characteristics they share.1  
 Scholar Jeremy Weinstein provides a useful definition of “violence” in the 
context of insurgency:  
 
“Patterns of rebel-civilian interaction that involve coercion. Violent 
homicides… killings are distinct events that are relatively easy to 
identify and count. Other forms of abuse include the beating of 
noncombatants, rape, abduction, forced relocation and labor, looting, 
and destruction.” 2 
 
Premeditated violence, used by either insurgent or counterinsurgent, that is perpetrated 
against non-combatant civilian targets, is “indiscriminate violence” or “indiscriminate 
force.” For the purpose of this study, “terrorism,” which can be defined as premeditated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant civilian targets, is considered a form of 
indiscriminate violence. 
 “Insurgency,” as defined by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps is “a protracted 
politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent 
control.”3 Essentially, insurgency is an armed rebellion against a formally constituted 
authority. Thus, the terms insurgents, rebels, revolutionaries, secessionists, guerillas, 
and/or militants are used interchangeably in this paper, as the implied meaning of these 
terms all share the existential principle of an armed group within a country challenging 
the established authority within that country. Internal battle among different armed 
1 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. Pg. 
9 
2 Weinstein, J. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Pg. 199-200 




                                                        
 
groups for power within a country is the embodiment of “civil war.” It should be made 
clear that for all intents and purposes of this research, insurgency is civil war. Debate 
over an absolute threshold to differentiate between the terms “civil war” and 
“insurgency” has no objective valuable for this work. 
 Following the U.S. Army and Marine Corps definition for insurgency, I define 
counterinsurgency to be military efforts to strengthen the control and legitimacy of an 
established government, occupying power, or other political authority to decrease 
insurgent control. Counterinsurgency captures a wide range of situations, from large scale 
military operations against armed rebels, to other non-lethal operations that “strengthen 
the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other 
political authority.”  
 The wide variety in types of efforts in captured by “counterinsurgency” is what 
distinguishes counterinsurgency as irregular warfare versus conventional combat 
campaigns. With this in mind, the nature of the mission of stability operations and 
counterinsurgency are extremely similar. David Ucko, points out that although 
counterinsurgency and stability operations are not entirely interchangeable, it is useful to 
view the two together, as they both “comprise of simultaneous military, political, and 
economic efforts to help a government stabilize and consolidate order in its own 
territory.”4 
 Finally, I should clarify what exactly I mean by “winning” in counterinsurgency 
warfare. I do not mean total elimination of insurgents, as this would be nearly if not 
completely impossible. Given that the goal of insurgency is to weaken the control and 
legitimacy of the established regime and eventually displace it from power, the notion of 
4 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. 
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“winning” counterinsurgency can be thought of in near-term and long-term phases. The 
first, near-term phase is winning the battle. Essentially this means that the incumbent 
regime remains in power. The second, long-term phase is winning the war. This means 
the dissolution or surrender of the insurgency as a group forcefully challenging the 
incumbent authority. Essentially, this is the process of convincing insurgents, by one way 
or another, that the fight is no longer worth fighting.  
 It is critical to consider the nature of conflict when developing strategy for 
different types of warfare. In his book Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice, French 
military officer David Galula outlines an important distinction between the nature of 
conflict concerning “conventional” warfare and “revolutionary” warfare. Although 
strategy in both types of war can rely heavily on the use of force to achieve objectives, 
revolutionary warfare differs from conventional warfare in that the nature of the objective 
is to gain [or keep] the support of the population in order to attain [or sustain] control of a 
state. 5 To paraphrase Clausewitz, “Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, 
inside a country, by every means.” 6 Insurgencies can take root long before the insurgent 
resorts to use of force. Galula explains that in countries that allow for political opposition, 
discontented groups have the opportunity to peacefully blossom via social and legal 
avenues, without resorting to violence. 7 Thus, logically, as long as discontented groups 
do not openly intend to engage in violent acts, counterinsurgents have no valid reason 
deploy the use of force. Counterinsurgency exists solely as a reaction to an insurgency; it 
is the counterinsurgent that bears the arduous burden of crafting a balanced, reactionary 
5 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 5 
6 Clausewitz 
7 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.. Pg. 3 
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strategy which Italian academic Lorenzo Zambernardi describes as protecting one’s 
forces, while physically crippling the insurgent, and avoiding civilian casualties. 8  
Due to the nature of revolutionary war, Galula highlights the significant role of 
politics in counterinsurgency. Perhaps the aforementioned Clausewitz quote requires a 
stipulation- Insurgents will pursue their policies inside a country by any means, as long 
as the means by which they pursue their policies do not blatantly cost the insurgents 
internal, political support.  This same logic applies to counterinsurgent operations. 
Galula explains that the entity at risk is the country’s political regime, and to defend it is 
a political concern.  Although the defense likely requires military action, all operations 
are carried out with the political goal in mind. 9  
If it is the case that the insurgent does not have the opportunity to peacefully rebel 
through political avenues, the next logical step is armed struggle [insurgency]. 10 
Rationally, the counterinsurgent has an armed response.  Galula mentions that there is an 
upper limit to the opportunity cost regarding use of force for both counterinsurgents and 
insurgents. He writes:  
“When an insurgent increases his guerilla activity…. he does not force 
the counterinsurgent to multiply his expenditures by the same factor. 
Sooner or later, a saturation point is reached, a point where the law of 
diminishing returns operates for both sides.” 11  
 
It is important to take this dynamic into account when examining the impacts of using 
indiscriminate force as a tactic. The utility of indiscriminate force differs between the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent; Galula writes “Insurgency warfare is specifically 
designed to allow the camp afflicted with congenital weakness to acquire strength 
8 Zambernardi, L. (2010). Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma.  
9 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.. Pg. 63 
10 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 32 
11 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.. Pg. 7 
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progressively while fighting… the counterinsurgent is endowed congenital strength, but 
he cannot use the enemy’s tactics.” 12 This thesis supports Galula’s point that the use of 
force provides more strategic gains for the insurgent than the counterinsurgent, and that 
the use of force reaches a point where it is not useful.  
The first chapter in this thesis builds on this theory, and examines the effects of 
prioritizing military lines of effort and use of indiscriminate force in national 
counterinsurgency operations. To test the real effects of prioritizing military action and 
indiscriminate force I look at three cases: Syria vs. The Muslim Brotherhood, Sri Lanka 
vs The Tamil Tigers, and Nigeria vs. Islamic militants (from Yan Tatsine to Boko 
Haram). While there are certainly differences among these insurgencies, all three cases 
have three things in common; first, all cases are examples of nationally-led 
counterinsurgency campaigns; second, the governments fighting these insurgencies all 
prioritized military lines of effort and used indiscriminate force; third, initial 
mobilizations of these groups were not violent in nature.  
 Careful examination of these cases showed a clear correlation between intensified 
insurgent violence and heavy handed counterinsurgency tactics. When these tactics were 
used, violence intensified and fell into a cyclical pattern, thus prolonging the insurgency. 
Finally, even in cases that were initially thought to be successful after using these tactics, 
for example Syria’s fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, there was a lack of long term 
success.  
 Reflecting on the lessons learned from the first chapter, the second chapter 
attempts to find conditions for conflict and stability in Iraq. Assuming that indiscriminate 
violence is not a viable strategy, I look at other potential explanations for stability and 
12 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 51 
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possible successes in counterinsurgency and humanitarian efforts in Iraq during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Drawing on development theory, COIN doctrine, and resilience 
theory, I evaluate whether the principles from these were enough to explain stemmed 
violence in certain areas of Iraq. I examine areas in all three of Iraq’s major sects, 
including Anbar, a Sunni region; Muthanna, a Shi’a region; and Duhok, a Kurdish region.  
 A deeper look into the local dynamics of Iraq during 2003-2011 bring to light an 
interesting reality. Region that development and COIN theory would normally categorize 
as “conflict prone” were actually some of the most stable in Iraq. In Iraq, national level 
counterinsurgency efforts were marginally important, rather, indigenous factors seemed 
to stem instability. The areas of Muthanna and Duhok remained stable due to ethnic 
homogenization and the presence of a capable security force, local to the community. In 
the case of Anbar province, where COIN and development efforts were heavily focused, 
the security situation was the worst in the country.  
 The third chapter of this thesis reflects on insight gained from the previous two 
chapters, and examines how traditional U.S. strategic culture, which has a penchant for 
high intensity combat, shaped initial American strategy in Iraq. The chapter then 
examines how the U.S. strategy adapted in an attempt to better address the conflict in 
Iraq. I examine how the U.S. successfully reoriented military strategy to focus on 
counterinsurgency and stability operations on an operational and tactical level through 
the introduction of Field Manual 3-24, but found that real institutional adaptation to 






CHAPTER ONE: Counterproductive Counterinsurgency: 
Reconsidering the Prioritization of Military Operations and 
Use of Indiscriminate Force 
 
How does prioritizing military lines of effort and use of indiscriminate force in 
counterinsurgency operations effect the nature and longevity of the insurgency? 
 
Introduction 
 Insurgencies exist in hundreds of different forms, and there are several approaches 
that scholars have considered to counter them. Much of the counterinsurgency 
scholarship has focused on foreign-implemented counterinsurgency efforts, with an 
emphasis on population-centric counterinsurgency strategy championed by David Galula 
and then General David Petraeus in Iraq. There has been less reflection, however, on state 
strategies when conducting domestic counterinsurgency campaigns. Nevertheless, 
existing accounts of domestic counterinsurgency operations have provoked debate about 
the value of protracted, population-centric, and development focused counterinsurgency 
efforts. Rival thinkers point to historical ‘successes’ of states that use indiscriminate force 
in domestic, irregular warfare. There is no silver bullet for insurgency, but probing the 
real effects of states’ indiscriminate use of force in counterinsurgency campaigns on the 
nature and longevity of internal conflict could provide current and future 
counterinsurgents with some valuable lessons. It is possible that states pursuing 
counterinsurgency campaigns that prioritize indiscriminate use of force paradoxically 
prolong and exacerbate the armed rebellions they aim to defeat.   
 There has been limited analysis of the long-term consequences that result from 
counterinsurgency strategies that prioritize military action and the use of indiscriminate 




not consider a plethora of other variables, and/or are short sighted in evaluating long-term 
achievements. This thesis examines three cases that have dealt with, and/or are currently 
dealing with lengthy insurgency within their borders. As this study illustrates, 
counterinsurgent’s use of indiscriminate force tends to backfire, boost insurgency 
resilience, and/or result in a deceiving, temporary culmination of internal conflict. There 
is an undeniable correlation between the prioritization of indiscriminate force in 
counterinsurgency campaigns with an escalated level of insurgent violence and 
prolongation of the rebellion; these tactics essentially serve to alienate the civilian 
population and increase the legitimacy of insurgents. This study concludes that 
prioritization of military lines of effort and indiscriminate force to deal with political 
insurrection is at best ineffective, and at worse counterproductive.  
 Although this research highlights adverse effects of  indiscriminate use of force in 
counterinsurgency operations, the necessity of military efforts should not be dismissed. 
Counterinsurgency, after all, is warfare. Rather, the findings of this paper suggest that 
military operations and selective use of force should compliment, rather than take 
precedence over, addressing the root political, social, and economic grievances that give 
insurgents a raison d’etre, population security, capacity building of local security forces, 
criminal justice procedures, and negotiations. 
 It is important to clarify that both insurgents and counterinsurgents use violence to 
wage war, but the purpose of this chapter is to explicitly analyze the effects of the 
national government’s prioritization of military lines of effort and use of indiscriminate 
force. I acknowledge that in many cases of insurgency, including the three cases I 




objectives. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and Boko 
Haram all committed horrific acts of violence in the name of their insurgency that earned 
all three groups a place on the list of designated terrorist organizations. Both the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent in these cases, and many others, used force that is 
indiscriminate, but scholarship13 suggests that the utility and effects of indiscriminate 
force are different between the insurgent and counterinsurgent; this paper analyzes the 
effects of the counterinsurgent’s use of indiscriminate force. The utility and effects of 
insurgent use of indiscriminate force are outside the scope of this paper, but it is an 




 In his book The Logic of Violence in Civil War Stathis Kalyvas points out that if 
counterinsurgents use violence to impose full jurisdiction over the state and defend the 
political regime, a minimum amount of military resources and capacity are required. 
Kalyvas writes, “The effective use of violence as a key instrument for establishing and 
maintaining control requires a premium- and thus for generating collaboration and 
deterring defection; in turn, effective violence requires discrimination.” 14  Historical 
accounts of countries experiencing significant insurgencies clearly show that most 
governments do not have this minimum amount of military resources and capacity 
required to effectively and selectively use violence. Thus, state’s use of violence alone 
13 See literature review section 
14 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 111 
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cannot be seen as a viable tool to defending political regimes and exert control over a 
population. 
 Galula’s cost/benefit analysis is a rational framework that looks at the way in 
which rational insurgents and counterinsurgents theoretically operate; however, Galula 
does not address the possibility of counterinsurgents use of force then having a 
counterproductive effect, by increasing insurgents’ use of retributive violence. Galula’s 
saturation point suggests a maximum, absolute threshold for use of violence by both 
insurgents and counterinsurgents, but evidence from the case studies in this paper 
suggests that violence is reproductive and cyclical in nature.  
 Military operations that use “mop up,” “search and destroy,” and “scorched earth” 
tactics seek to eliminate insurgents while simultaneously undercutting the insurgency’s 
civilian foundation. 15 Kalyvas expands on the rational use of force in his book, and 
posits that as long as the population [civilian foundation] has no way to react against 
violence, “its effect is to increase compliance with authority among those who feel they 
may be pushed into total passivity and political abdication.” 16 Employing this logic, the 
state should theoretically avoid indiscriminate violence in the name of counterinsurgency 
operations, as civilian victims of such violence could logically react, for example, by 
joining the insurgency. Kalyvas emphasizes, “Random violence is much less likely to 
achieve its aims in the midst of a civil war, where the presence of a rival makes defection 
possible.”  Because indiscriminate violence decreases the opportunity cost of 
collaboration with a rival actor, it is an impractical approach to counterinsurgency. 
15 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 149 
16 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 142 
11 
 
                                                        
 
Kalyvas proposes, “Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in civil war.” 17 Galula’s 
work concurs with Kalyvas’; Galula rationalizes that the counterinsurgent cannot use 
terrorism, which is a form of indiscriminate violence, as a tactic. He writes, “It would be 
too self-defeating, since terrorism is a source of disorder, which is precisely what the 
counterinsurgent aims to stop.” 18  
 Kalyvas and Galula’s guides for justifying the strategic use and disuse of force in 
counterinsurgency are challenged by proponents like Martin Van Creveld, who advocates 
that the prioritization large scale military action and indiscriminate force is one of the two 
ways that counterinsurgency wars can be won. In his book The Transformation of War, 
Van Creveld posits that protraction of the war is actually the key to victory in 
counterinsurgency. 19 Additionally he uses the case of Hafaz al Assad’s 1982 crushing of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria as an exemplary model for counterinsurgency. Van 
Creveld identifies five key takeaways from the al Assad strategy. These include: 
First, there are situations in which cruelty is necessary. Second, once 
you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If 
another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Third, 
act [militarily] as soon as possible. Fourth, strike openly, without 
apology or excuses about collateral damage. Fifth, do not command the 
strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to 
have a scapegoat. 20 
 
In a more recent work, Van Creveld elaborates on a second model for successful 
counterinsurgency strategy, citing British operations in Northern Ireland as a model for 
success. 21  While Van Creveld’s offering of a second approach for successful 
17 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 144 
18 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 52 
19 Van Creveld, M. (1991). The Transformation of War. 
20 Van Creveld, M. (1991). The Transformation of War. Pg. 241-245 




                                                        
 
counterinsurgency provides many valuable insights, this paper challenges only his first 
approach — the scorched earth method that focuses on swift, indiscriminate use of force. 
 
 Considering insight gained from current scholarship, it is apparent that 
recognition of, and dealing with an insurgency in the appropriate manner is extremely 
important during the embryonic stage. Galula and Kalyvas offer useful insight on the 
nature of insurgency itself, and why the strategy of conventional warfare is completely 
inapplicable to counterinsurgency operations. This paper further explores this 
understanding, and analyzes how counterinsurgents that are essentially “using the 
enemies’ tactics” affects the nature and longevity of insurgencies.    
 Additionally, prominent scholarship that supports the prioritization of heavy-
handed military action and the use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency is 
outdated. The first part of Van Creveld’s work suggests that the above-mentioned five 
guidelines for counterinsurgency à-la-Assad is a roadmap for victory against insurgents. 
However, the current situation in Syria, specifically regarding the Muslim Brotherhood 
insurgency that Hafaz al Assad supposedly crushed, suggests that Van Crevled’s 
conclusions should be re-examined. This paper fills this gap in analysis, and provides 
new insights to former assumptions.   
 Considering the ongoing debate between scholars about population-centric versus 
enemy-destruction-focused counterinsurgency, it is important to mention that not giving 
precedence to military operations in counterinsurgency does not mean that the military 
does not have an extremely important role in counterinsurgency. Many scholars agree 
that the population gravitates towards political groups that can provide them with 




counterinsurgency strategy. This premise is outside the bounds of this chapter, but it is a 
critical topic that should be further explored.  
 
Theory & Hypothesis 
 There is ample literature in international relations that explores the significance of 
unaddressed domestic political, social and economic grievances that give insurgents’ 
raison d’etre. As a result, much of the counterinsurgency doctrine addresses ways to 
ameliorate popular grievances in order to deprive insurgents of the population’s potential 
sympathy and compliance. Opposing literature disregards the value of addressing 
domestic grievances, and instead, advocates for the prioritization of military lines of 
effort and indiscriminate force as a viable counterinsurgency strategy. Supporters of this 
heavy-handed approach posit that if the state is challenged by a rebellion that is less 
equipped in terms of weapons and numbers of soldiers, a fire-power focused approach is 
rational. This view on counterinsurgency erroneously leads state authorities to choose 
between a strategy of military destruction or one that includes political conciliations. In 
reality, the answer lies somewhere in the middle.   
 This chapter assesses the real effects of states’ use of indiscriminate force in 
counterinsurgency campaigns on the nature and longevity of internal conflict.  
 It is important to note that although the insurgent is not always the initiator of 
violence, it is the insurgent’s acts, whether they are triggered preemptively or in response 
to the government’s acts, that begins “the war.” The long-term effects of 
counterinsurgents’ use of indiscriminate force in counterinsurgency has been 




prioritize military lines of effort and use indiscriminate force paradoxically prolong and 
exacerbate the armed rebellions they aim to defeat.   
 The remaining sections of this chapter carefully analyze three cases that advocates 
of ruthless counterinsurgency tactics frequently cite as success stories. Upon careful 
scrutiny, there appears to be a plethora of other variables, which significantly contributed 
to the ‘defeat’ of the insurgencies. Additionally, recent events in Syria have brought to 
light a misconception in literature’s evaluation of long-term sustainability of Hafaz al 
Assad approach. I hypothesize that indiscriminate, ruthless counterinsurgency tactics tend 
to backfire, boost insurgency resilience, and/or result in a deceitful, temporary 
culmination of internal conflict.  
 
Methods 
 It is possible that counterinsurgency strategies that prioritize military operations 
and use indiscriminate force further alienate the civilian population and increase the 
legitimacy of insurgents, which leads to prolonged rebellion and escalation in violence. In 
this case, patterns of escalated levels of insurgent violence appear to be cyclical. Due to 
this lethal cycle, insurgencies in this environment remain fluid and drawn-out.    
 This paper uses qualitative data from three case studies to determine the effects of 
prioritizing military action and indiscriminate force on both the nature and longevity of 
insurgencies. This paper examines patterns in proliferation of violence concerning the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the current Islamic insurgency of 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. These cases were selected 
using three criteria: First, all cases involved states — formerly or currently — pursuing 




foreign nations or coalitions, such as British counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland or the 
International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan are outside the realm of 
this chapter. Second, incumbent authorities in all cases conducted campaigns that 
prioritized military operations including indiscriminate force. Third, initial mobilizations 
of the selected insurgencies were not violent in nature.  
 
 Should my hypothesis prove correct, there will be three noticeable patterns. First, 
there will be a clear correlation between intensified insurgent violence and heavy-handed 
counterinsurgency operations. Second, the violent actions and reactions on behalf of both 
the insurgent and counterinsurgent will be cyclical, thus prolonging the nature of the 
insurgency. Third, although the use of indiscriminate force in counterinsurgency 
operations could provide an immediate tactical win, there will be a lack of long-term 
success as a result of this strategy.  
 
Data/ Case Studies 
 
Syria VS. The Muslim Brotherhood 
 The Muslim Brotherhood spread from Egypt to Syria in the 1940s. In its early 
stages, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood meaningfully and peacefully participated in 
Syria’s political apparatus. Almost two decades after the organization took root in the 
country, the organization came to clash with the Baath Party, which came to power in 
Syria in 1963.22 As a result of the Brotherhood’s attempts to undermine the Baath party, 
Hafaz al Assad — the incumbent president at the time — banned the organization’s 
22 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
16 
 
                                                        
 
activities in 1964. The following inability of the Brotherhood to participate in the 
political system via peaceful and legal avenues provoked a violent response, and armed 
members of the Brotherhood attacked government buildings and offices.23 During this 
time, some members of the Brotherhood defected in an effort to take even more violent 
measures against the regime, and formed an spin-off organization called the Combatant 
Vanguard. In 1979, the Combatant Vanguard attacked a military school in Aleppo and 
killed 83 student officers.24  
 The Muslim Brotherhood was subsequently outlawed in 1980, and membership in 
the organization was punishable by death.25 In an effort to end the conflict and the defeat 
insurgency, Hafaz al Assad called for the complete obliteration of Hama using chemical 
weapons, a city in Syria known to be sympathetic to members of the Brotherhood. 
Estimates of civilian casualties vary, with numbers between 10,000 and 30,000 
slaughtered.26 
 After this incident, the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to have largely disappeared 
from Syria. Because of this, many scholars use Hafaz al Assad’s ruthless use of 
indiscriminate force as a model for counterinsurgency operations. It is important to note 
that although the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to have ceased activity in Syria,, members 
of the Syrian Brotherhood simply went underground, and operated out of Jordan, Turkey, 
and Iraq. 27  
 When Bashar al Assad, Hafaz al Assad’s son came to power in June 2000, he 
initially took a more tolerant stance on the Muslim Brotherhood and released hundreds of 
23 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
24 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
25 Rassas, S. (2014). Syria's Muslim Brotherhood: Past and Present 
26 Khan, A. (2012). On 30th anniversary of Hama Massacre, Syrian Troops Lock Down City. 
27 Talhamy, Y. (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn: The Syrian Uprising. 
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Brotherhood prisoners.28 However, Bashar kept the ban on Brotherhood membership in 
place.29 In an attempt to gain political influence while operating outside of Syria, the 
Muslim Brotherhood reached out to other moderate opposition forces, and in 2005 took 
part in the Damascus Declaration for National Democratic Change.30 The Declaration 
was a peaceful effort, and included Islamist, nationalist, Kurdish, and leftist groups.31 
The Declaration, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, renounced violence.32  
 In 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood officially merged with supporters of Abdul 
Halim Khaddam, the former Vice President of Syria under the Baath regime, who 
defected from the regime a year earlier, and formed the National Salvation Front.33 It is 
important to note, that the entirety of the Brotherhoods political organizing was done in 
exile. Although the National Salvation Front served as the strongest Syrian opposition 
group, the Brotherhood and group in general suffered from the alliance with Khaddam; 
many Syrians were hesitant to support the group due to Khaddam’s former position in the 
Assad regime. Consequently, the Brotherhood estranged itself with the National 
Salvation Front for two reasons. First, the Brotherhood hoped that by separating itself 
from the National Salvation Front, regain credibility with the Syrian people. Second, the 
Brotherhood had actually stopped its anti-regime activities in hopes that this moderate 
and peaceful approach would win the Brotherhood a seat at the table once more.34 This 
28 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
29 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
30 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
31 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
32 Talhamy, Y. (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn: The Syrian Uprising. 
33 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
34 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
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approach did not work, however, and the Assad regime refused to repeal the law banning 
the Brotherhood.35  
 In another peaceful effort to rejoin the Syrian political and societal system, the 
Syrian Brotherhood’s newly elected leader, Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfeh, worked with 
Turkish diplomats further to try and convince the Assad regime to lift the ban on 
Brotherhood membership.36  These efforts did not bear fruit. 37  
 
 In the ongoing Syrian civil war, Bashar al Assad has resorted to the same ruthless 
tactics used by his father to deal with the insurgent groups that are trying to remove him 
from power. As of August 2015, the incumbent Syrian regime has relied on ruthless 
tactics, including the use of indiscriminate force in its efforts to quash internal rebellion. 
As any political opposition to the regime, including the Muslim Brotherhood, is denied 
access to political and legal avenues, many opposition groups have resorted to arms and 
alliances with extremist groups. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is not known to be 
physically involved in battle, they now support radical opposition groups in Syria by 
providing financial resources, and by aiding in radicalization and recruitment processes.38  
 
Case Study: Sri Lanka VS. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)  
35 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
36 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
37 Syria in Crisis. (2014). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
38 Talhamy, Y. (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn: The Syrian Uprising. 
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 The 2009 defeat of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) is widely known as an exemplary 
case of a successful, domestic counterinsurgency campaign that prioritzed military action 
and use of indiscriminate force.39 The Tamil rebellion is also one of the longest running 
rebellions in history; thus, this case is particularly useful for analyzing the effects of 
prioritizing military lines of effort and indiscriminate force in a domestic 
counterinsurgency campaign. 
 The Tamil insurgency originated from a secessionist nationalist campaign in 
1976. After Sri Lanka’s independence from Britain, the Tamil minority was politically, 
socially, and economically excluded from Sri Lankan society, and denied access to 
political and legal avenues to tackle their grievances. Subsequently, the group turned to 
armed rebellion. 40  
 LTTE carried out its first attack on the Sri Lankan army in 1983. The army’s 
counterattack, known as “Black July,” is seen by many scholars as a planned massacre of 
Tamil civilians; this incident became the precedent for ensuing counterinsurgency 
operations. For the next twenty years, the Tamil Tigers ruthlessly attacked government 
forces, and in turn, Sri Lanka sustained a strategy of using indiscriminate force in areas 
populated by Tamils.. During this time, there was a surge in LTTE membership, 
particularly among Tamil youths. Throughout the next two decades, the incumbent Sri 
Lanken government focused their counterinsurgency efforts on the battlefield, and 
cyclical violence occurred between the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil rebels. It is 
important to note that as a result of some political concessions, a few ceasefires were 
39 Moorcraft, P. (2014). Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers : The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War. 
40 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994). The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity.  
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brokered during the early 2000s; however, none of them survived long enough to have a 
substantial effect.41 
 The LTTE took a serious internal hit in 2004 when former senior commander 
Colonel Karuna left the group to form his own faction. The commander departed on the 
grounds that Northern Tiger leadership was not paying attention to the needs of Eastern 
Tamils. Karuna had a significant following within the organization, so his departure 
inevitably resulted a huge loss of support for LTTE on behalf of the Eastern Tamil 
population. 
 In another significant incident in 2006, the LTTE cut off the water supply for 
15,000 government controlled villages by blocking the gates of the Mavil Oya 
reservoir.42 This was arguably a poor strategic move. The incident resulted in extreme 
anger on behalf of both the Sri Lankan government and many previously indifferent 
water-deprived villagers, and devolved into a large-scale military offensive led by the 
newly elected Sri Lankan government of Mahinda Rajapaksa. 43 For the next three years, 
Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency strategy was focused solely on military efforts and use of 
indiscriminate force on Tamil rebels and their supporters. By 2009, Sri Lanka claimed 
military victory over the LTTE.  
 
Case Study: Nigeria VS. Islamic Militants (Yan Tatsine, Boko Haram) 
 The name and leadership of Islamic insurgents in Nigeria has gone through 
several phases, but the common denominator among all of them is their desire to 
overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law. In 1980, vast riots 
41 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994). The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity.  
42 Sri Lanka Forces Attack Reservoir. (2006). BBC News. 
43 Moorcraft, P. (2014). Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers : The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War. 
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between the Islamic fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine, also knows as Followers of 
Maitatsine, and government forces resulted in thousands of casualties and an ensuing 
military crackdown. Scholars have pointed out that the government crackdown had 
counterproductive effects, as the harsh crackdown actually resulted in more violence. For 
the two decades following the repressive crackdown, there was a significant spread of 
unrest and violence across Northern Nigeria.44  
 Nigeria continues to struggle with radical Islamic insurgents today- many who 
share roots with the late Yan Tatsine sect. Muhammad Yusuf, who headed a group of 
young radical Islamists in the 1990s, founded Boko Haram in 2002. 45 The grievances 
and goals of the present day Islamic militants, for the most part, have remained 
unchanged since the time of Maitatsine. Political scientist Abimbola Adesoji points out 
that “Despite the time gap between the Maitatsine riots and the Boko Haram insurrection, 
the socio-economic conditions that sustained the risings in 1980 are relevant to the Boko 
Haram situation.” 46  Nigeria is plagued by mass poverty, inequality in educational 
opportunities, unemployment, and governmental corruption, including the misuse of 
resources. 47  Also unchanged, are the counterinsurgency tactics employed by the 
Nigerian security forces. 
 Despite the organization’s current status as a terrorist organization, Boko Haram 
was not initially violent. In fact, the group operated rather peacefully during the first 
44 Ewi, M. (2014). Why Nigeria Needs a Criminal Tribunal and Not Amnesty for Boko Haram. Institute for 
Security Studies. 
45 Sergie, M., Johnson, T. (2014). Backgrounder: Boko Haram. The Council on Foreign Relations. 
46 Adesoji, A. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of 
the Nigerian State. Africa Today, 57(4). Pgs. 98-119. 
47 desoji, A. The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. African Spectrum, 45(2). Pg. 
45, 2, 95-108. 
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seven years of its existence.48 There was a noticible turning point, however, in July 2009, 
when Nigerian forces deployed indiscriminate force against Boko Haram sympathizers 
protesting because of a disagreement over a motorbike helmet law. During the clashes, 
Yusuf was taken into police custody and executed. The death of the organization’s 
spiritual leader prompted many in the Nigerian government to claim victory49 over the 
insurgency. However, much like the case of Maitatsine in 1980, “victory” as a result of 
Nigeria’s military efforts  alone was short lived. 
 Boko Haram resurfaced a year later under a different leader with increased ties to 
various international extremist groups and improved operational and military capacity.50  
In August 2011, Boko Haram committed both its first intentional suicide bombing and its 
first lethal attack against a foreign target, when a suicide bomber struck a U.N. building 
in Abuja. Boko Haram attempted to justify the attack by claiming it was retributive.51 
Whether or not Boko Haram’s motives during the time of the bombing genuinely were 
retributive or something else, Boko Haram’s message in claiming the attack as such were 
clear: the state’s use of indiscriminate force will be returned with more indiscriminate 
force on behalf of the insurgents.  
 Kalyvas posits, “The central aim of indiscriminate violence is to shape civilian 
behavior indirectly through association.” 52 In this case, it is apparent that Nigeria is 
shaping civilian behavior in the exact opposite way of which it intends. In a Hearing on 
Countering the Threat Posed by Boko Haram, the Assistant Secretary of State for African 
48 Cook, D. (2011). The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Combating Terrorism Centre. 
49 Blanchard, L. (2014). Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. Congressional Research 
Service. Pg. 2 
50 Blanchard, L. (2014). Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. Congressional Research 
Service. Pg. 2 
51 Sergie, M., Johnson, T. (2014). Backgrounder: Boko Haram. The Council on Foreign Relations. 
52 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 150 
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Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated, “Experts speculate that the group’s supporters 
may be driven by frustration with perceived disparities in the application of laws… 
and/or the abusive response of security forces in the region.”53 Kalyvas’ proposition that 
indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in civil war,” 54  is exemplified by the 




 In light of recent events in Syria, it is important to re-evaluate the effectiveness of 
Hafaz al Assad’s efforts to get rid of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. For many years, it 
was generally accepted that Assad’s prioritization of military lines of effort and use of 
indiscriminate force led to the defeat of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and their 
disappearance from Syria.  For this reason, there is some evidence against the first and 
second part of my hypothesis, as ruthless counterinsurgency tactics and indiscriminate 
force appeared to yield some initial success. Thus, there was not an imminent opportunity 
for insurgents and counterinsurgents to engage in acts of [cyclical] violence. However, 
after a thorough, long term investigation of this case, it is clear that the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood was not entirely ‘defeated,’ as the group simply relocated to neighboring 
countries and/or moved its operations underground.   
 After a brief spell of relative tolerance, Bashar al Assad’s turn towards his 
father’s ruthless approach toward counterinsurgency has proved, in many ways, 
counterproductive. To this effect, the third portion of my hypothesis is supported. 
Although there was an initial illusion of effectiveness of Hafaz al Assad’s strategy, 
53 Thomas-Greenfield, L. (2013). Countering the Threat Posed by Boko Haram. Congressional testimony 
before House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 
54 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 144 
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counterinsurgency à-la-Assad has not withstood the test of time. The re-emergence 
of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the face of the present crisis has rendered 
previously concrete conclusions about the success of Hafaz al Assad’s 
counterinsurgency strategy obsolete. Given this insight, existing literature should be 
updated, as former conclusions are not supported.  
 Careful analysis of the cases in this study reveals brings to light a previously 
overlooked reality. In the case of the defeat of the LTTE, which is a prominent case that 
proponents of destruction-focused counterinsurgency and use of indiscriminate force 
claim, there is evidence that a number of internal spoilers significantly contributed to the 
destruction of the organization. Military lines of effort alone did not result in a decisive 
quashing of the group. In examining earlier stages of the insurgency, there is a clear 
correlation between heavy-handed military operations and insurgent violence. Further, 
indiscriminate use of force during Black July led to a cycle of further indiscriminate 
violence on behalf of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. We can posit that this 
prolonged the lifetime of the rebellion.  
 The importance of internal fracturing and other key variables that contributed to 
the defeat of the Tamil Tigers has been overlooked in analyses claiming ‘military defeat.’ 
The departure of Colonel Karuna and subsequent loss of a huge portion of the LTTE 
support base in Eastern Sri Lanka certainly had a crippling effect on the organization. 
Poor strategic moves, loss of key leadership, and loss of popular support severely 
weakened the LTTE from within. It was only after the LTTE was in the process of self-
destruction that the Sri Lankan military was able to triumph. To characterize the defeat of 




 Violence propagated by religious insurgents in Nigeria is a reoccurring problem. 
Nigerian leadership has continuously prioritized military lines of effort and 
indiscriminate use of force in its counterinsurgency strategy to no permanent avail. This 
fact reveals a failure in the Nigerian state’s approach to deal with the Islamic insurgents 
within its borders. By critically assessing the regime’s past and present strategies, 
counterinsurgents can learn from shortcomings and use insight gained from this analysis 
to shape more effective counterinsurgency strategy.  
 This case provides ample evidence that supports the first part of my hypothesis. 
The subsequent spread of violence across Northern Nigera after the 1980 crackdown on 
the Maitatsine Movement is a clear example of heavy-handed counterinsurgency and use 
of indiscriminate force producing a counterproductive effect. Similarly, the resilience of 
Boko Haram despite ruthless government offenses and the execution of their leader 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s approach to counterinsurgency. 
Additionally the second part of my hypothesis holds true; the observed cyclical violence 
between insurgents and counterinsurgents over years of Islamic insurgency in Nigeria has 
prolonged rebellion and led to a conflict spiral, without resulting in conflict resolution. 
As Islamic insurgency in Nigeria is an ongoing phenomenon, there has not yet been an 
opportunity to determine in final terms the long-term consequences of indiscriminate 
violence in Nigerian counterinsurgency operations; however, the near-term observations 
do not look promising. Boko Haram’s membership continues to proliferate, and the group 
continues to engage in violent attacks. Since 2010, over 5,000 people have been killed in 
Boko Haram-related violence, making it one of the deadliest rebel groups in the world. 55 
55 Blanchard, L. (2014). Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. Congressional Research 
Service. Pg. 3  
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 Napoléon Bonaparte said, “Burn some farms and some big villages in the 
Morbihan and begin to make some examples… it is only by making war terrible, that the 
inhabitants themselves will rally against the brigands and will finally feel that their 
apathy is extremely costly to them.”56 It appears that states following Bonaparte’s logic 
when forming counterinsurgency strategy are misguided.  
 The cases examined in this study each present a unique context for understanding 
the effect of states’ prioritization of military lines of effort and use of indiscriminate force 
on the nature and longevity of irregular conflict. There is no panacea for insurgency, but 
evidence from this study concludes that pursuing counterinsurgency campaigns that 
prioritize use of indiscriminate force paradoxically prolong and exacerbate the rebellions 
they aim to defeat. In this regard, the hypotheses of this paper proved correct. It is 
important to note, that there is a lack of empirical evidence for controlled cases, which 
lack the existence of violence. For example, we do not — and  cannot — precisely know 
how successful the insurgent groups would have been in the complete absence of 
counterinsurgent use of indiscriminate force.  However, this fact does not detract from 
the importance of reflection on states’ past and present counterinsurgency campaigns. It 
is evident that prioritizing military lines of effort and using of indiscriminate force does 
not prove valuable for states engaging in domestic counterinsurgency campaigns. This 
strategy is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive. Thus, it is critical that 
56 Quoted in Dupuy 1997:158-9 from Napoléon Bonaparte’s letter to the West’s commanding Army 
General Guillaume Brune who was preparing to crush the monarchist insurgence.  
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every military move be weighed with regard to its political effects, and visa versa.” 57 
Considering this insight, effectively defeating an insurgency is not a short-term endeavor, 
and requires states to exercise a holistic and patient approach to counterinsurgency 
strategy.  
  
57 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 5 
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Chapter TWO: Conditions for Stability and Conflict in Iraq 
 
Why have some vulnerable communities in Iraq remained relatively stable over the past 
decade, while others have engaged in substantial violence? 
 
Introduction 
 Insurgency in the Middle East has proliferated at an alarming rate over the last 
decade; this engenders an imminent need to reexamine weak points in counterinsurgency 
strategy and stabilization efforts. The first chapter in this thesis portfolio examined 
national counterinsurgency campaigns in the cases of Sri Lanka versus the Tamil Tigers, 
Syria versus the Muslim Brotherhood, and Nigeria versus Boko Haram. The findings of 
the paper posit that indiscriminate force is not a viable counterinsurgency strategy. 
 Possible reasons that prioritizing military lines of effort and use of indiscriminate 
force are not a viable counterinsurgency method is because this method does not address 
root political, economic, and social grievances that provide insurgencies with reason to 
exist. Furthermore, indiscriminate violence on behalf of the state often pushes indifferent 
citizens to seek security from insurgents.  
 Many scholars agree that counterinsurgency requires a holistic strategy that 
includes military, political, and economic lines of effort. Still, many national level 
counterinsurgency campaigns have failed, because local dynamics can shape larger 
outcomes. This dynamic is exemplified in the history of Iraq. Iraq has a long, cyclical 
history of oppression and political dissent between its sects. Saddam Hussein’s Sunni 
regime abused Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurdish peoples for decades, and the Shi’a-led 
government headed by Nouri al Malaki after the U.S. occupation continued Iraq’s 




Sunnis. Furthermore, there is deep-rooted frustration left over from decades of Iraqi 
corruption, sanctions, tyranny, colonialism, and foreign invasions that has contributed to 
the destabilization of Iraq. One could argue that counterinsurgency and stability efforts in 
Iraq over the last decade have failed; as of August 2015 and current fight against the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the U.S. is making some tactical gains, but 
insurgents are still acquiring new recruits at a rapid pace; 58  in other words, 
counterinsurgents are winning battles but the insurgents are winning the war. 
 However, even amidst widespread regional instability and accompanying 
violence, some communities in Iraq have achieved stability. For the purpose of this 
chapter, stability means that much of the population in these areas has resisted engaging 
in violence and social structures in these communities have remained intact. In some 
cases, communities have even shifted from passively “tolerating” insurgencies to actively 
mobilizing to fight against them. The phenomenon of stable communities in a larger 
environment of conflict leads to an important question— what makes these communities 
different? Why are these communities able to resist participation in violence, and in some 
cases, become motivated to become active counterinsurgents, whereas others do not?  
 Analyzing communities that have shied away from participating in the conflict in 
Iraq is useful to those in the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism field for a few reasons. 
First, identifying characteristics of non-participating communities could help 
policymakers prioritize points to strengthen in vulnerable communities. Second, insights 
from this research could guide future efforts to build resiliency in conflict-prone areas, 
which could help prevent future irregular wars and destabilization.  
58 Tawfeeq, M.,  Carter, C.  (2014). Officials: ISIS recruiting on the rise in Sunni areas of Iraq. CNN. 
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 This thesis chapter draws on COIN, community-based insurgent mobilization, 
development, and resilience theory. Taking lessons from existing literature that outlines 
incentives for individuals and groups to partake in internal rebellion, I assess whether 
these elements are able to explain resilient, and in some cases ‘flipped,’ communities in 
Iraq against the backdrop of decades of sectarian violence.  
 The fields of psychology, ecology, disaster management, and science and 
engineering all conceptualize resiliency in different ways. For all intents and purposes, 
this paper focuses on “positive resilience,” which is the “the condition of relative stability 
and even tranquility in areas recently or intermittently beset by violence.”59 Essentially, 
resiliency is the capacity of social systems/communities to cope with war and violence, 
and maintain social order and cohesiveness. For the purpose of this chapter, communities 
that have exhibited resiliency and a capacity to maintain social order and cohesiveness 
without becoming engulfed in conflict are considered “stable.”  
Literature Review 
 There are three major trends in existing literature that attempt to explain people’s 
motivation to participate in rebellion: social dynamics, economic incentives, and political 
and institutional weakness. Scholarship describing the environmental conditions that 
make a community amenable to insurgency also fit into these same categories. However, 
many scholars generally agree that there is rarely a single explanation for participation in 
insurgency and violence. Thus, many of the theories described in the following section 
are not necessarily competing, and often overlap. For the purpose of this chapter, the 
causes, environmental pre-requisites, and individual/community motivations to rebel 
59 Davis, D. (2012). Urban resilience in situations of chronic violence. Final report of the urban resilience in 
chronic violence project. Pg 9.  
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described in the literature review are assumed to be characteristic of “non-resilient” 
communities.  
Social Dynamics 
 One school of thought on insurgent mobilization is rooted in the idea that 
individuals, and/or communities, essentially do a cost benefit analysis of participation in 
civil war. Simply put, if the entity gains more than it would lose by joining the 
insurgency, the entity will choose to join the insurgency. In the context of social 
dynamics, this cost-benefit rationale can be broken down into two paths: the entity will 
either 1) gain social capital by fitting in with the communal social norm, which can be 
either supporting an insurgency or fighting it, or 2) be socially sanctioned by supporting 
or fighting the insurgency, depending on the social norm for each specific case.  
 Roger Peterson’s book Resistance and Rebellion explores how social norms, focal 
points, and rational calculation combine to drive individuals to participate in rebellion. 
Based on data from Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance during the 1940s and 1987-1991, 
Peterson uncovered key elements that are crucial in pushing ordinary people to join in 
armed rebellions. For example, Peterson found that the formation of resent as a result of 
“policies that heighten the perception that one’s group is located in an unjust position on 
a status hierarchy”60 can embolden people to “accept risk and act” 61 against those who 
enforce unjust policies.  
 Peterson’s point that “formation of resentment” is crucial to popular mobilization 
and creation of rebellion is shared by David Galula, one of the “fathers” of population 
60 Petersen, R. (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: lessons from Eastern Europe.  Pg. 297. 
61 Petersen, R. (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: lessons from Eastern Europe.  Pg. 299. 
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centric counterinsurgency strategy. In his book Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice, 
Galula posits that the first, critical pre-requisite to insurgency formation is a cause; he 
writes, “The cause must be such that the counterinsurgent cannot espouse it too or can do 
so only at the risk of losing his power, which is, after all, what he is fighting for.”62 The 
cause is the ultimate psychological justification for individuals or groups to join 
insurgencies. The cause is an existing problem, which can be social, political, economic, 
racial, sectarian, or artificial in nature, or an amalgamation of several of these things;63 
the formation of resent results in a “cause” which can motivate an individual or group of 
people to participate in violence.  
 Existing scholarship on resiliency of Iraqi communities to sectarian violence and 
civil war generally supports the reverse logic that without an environment conducive to 
insurgency, at least on the micro/community level, areas should generally be peaceful and 
stable. Dr. Ami Carpenter, a professor of peace studies and conflict resolution, 
highlighted four elements that guide community resilience in her book Community 
Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad. The first element Carpenter describes is 
social capital, which draws on Peterson’s principles of social norms and institutions that 
determine the quality of a community’s social fabric.64  The second element is economic 
development; the third is information and communication resources; and the fourth is 
community competence.  
 Peterson’s research also pays attention to focal and reward mechanisms and 
norms. Essentially, justifications for reward and focal mechanisms as drivers for popular 
62 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 13. 
63 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 13. 
64 Carpenter, A. (2014). Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad. 
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mobilization for insurgency are derived in the idea of cultural nuances, such as receiving 
honor or socially accepted violence, balancing out the risks involved with joining 
insurgency.65 This latter point is also supported by social scientist Paul Collier, author of 
The Bottom Billion. In his research, Collier found that developing countries with high 
degrees of “hopelessness” were more likely to experience civil war. 66  
 Stathis Kalyvas also analyzes, on an individual level, the motivations to 
participate in insurgency. In his book The Logic of Violence in Civil War, he makes the 
important point that some individual motivations to join insurgencies have nothing to do 
with social norms, and are truly unique to the individual. Kalyvas writes, “While political 
actors ‘use’ civilians to collect information and win the war, it is also the case that 
civilians ‘use; political actors to settle their own private conflicts.”67 This brings to light 
an important consideration: not all participation in political violence can be explained by 
political science theory. Although this paper does not delve into individual psychology, 
scholars do take this into account. Peterson acknowledges that while communal cultural 
and social motivations are important areas of consideration, sometimes individuals have 
unique, inestimable motivations to rebel.  
Economic Grievances  
 Another theoretical trend that attempts to explain why men rebel is based on 
economic discontent. There is ample literature that theorizes a negative correlation 
between higher levels economic development and occurrence of insurgency. The findings 
from Amy Carpenter’s research in sectarian neighborhoods in Baghdad supports this 
65 Petersen, R. (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: lessons from Eastern Europe. Pg. 299 
66 Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion : why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about 
it. 
67 Kalyvas, S., (2006). The Logic of Violence In Civil War. Pg. 14 
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correlation. This theory is also supported by Collier’s research, in which he created a 
statistical analysis of factors indicating the likelihood of a civil war; in addition to poor 
governance, Collier found that poor economic conditions, lack of social and educational 
programs are linked to an increased likelihood of civil war.68 Mancur Olson’s analysis 
also considers economic incentives, and narrows incentives down to the individual. Olson 
posits that participation in insurgency can come down to the availability of personal 
benefit for participation.69 Olson’s work determines that if it is fiscally beneficial for the 
person to participate, he or she will do so. Olson’s research fits within the cost-benefit 
framework described in the previous sections of this paper.  
Political and Institutional Weakness 
 The third category to explain why men rebel is rooted in political reasons and 
institutional weaknesses. Scholar Karl Deutsch, author of Social Mobilization and 
Political Development, writes that social mobilization in the context of political violence 
is a process in which “major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological 
commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns 
of socialization and behavior.”70 Deutsch justifies that if the level of social mobilization 
is highly disproportionate to the performance of the government in its expected role, there 
will be a higher level of political violence.71 This compliments concepts championed by 
Galula, which emphasize the importance of institutional capacity to adequately address 
the needs and grievances of its citizens, and exhibit control over its population. 
68 Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion : why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about 
it. 
69 Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
70 Deutsch, K. (1961). Social Mobilization and Political Development. Pg 3. 
71 Deutsch, K. (1961). Social Mobilization and Political Development. Pg 3. 
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Essentially, a weak government lacks the ability to exercise control over and appease its 
population. Galula lists “weakness of the counterinsurgent” as a key prerequisite for 
popular mobilization and successful insurgency.  
Additional Areas of Consideration 
 There has been some attention paid in insurgency literature to the role of other 
factors such as geography, population size, and external support. Galula considers 
“geographic conditions” favorable to the insurgent to be a vital prerequisite for successful 
insurgency. In fact, he condemns an insurgency to failure if geography is not in its 
favor.72 Galula considers geographic conditions favorable to the insurgent to be large 
physical territory and population size, rugged terrain, and forgiving climate.  Galula also 
states, “If the country is an archipelago, the insurgency cannot easily spread.”73 In these 
environments, counterinsurgents do not typically have access to reliable transport and 
communication facilities through which to adequately implement counterinsurgency 
operations.74 Amy Carpenter’s research supports Galula’s supposition regarding the role 
of information and communications resources. During her research in neighborhoods in 
Baghdad, she found counterinsurgents in underdeveloped areas to be less effective 
because they do not typically have viable means of communication.  
 Control of the civilian population also highlighted in Kalyvas’s book. Like 
Galula, Kalyvas analyzes conditions for likely collaboration with insurgents and stresses 
the importance of distribution of control. He posits that areas with high levels of disputed 
control will have higher levels of violence.  Drawing from this point, the importance of a 
72 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 23 
73 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 23 
74 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 23 
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capable and legitimate security force that is able to exert control over the population is 
brought to light.  
 There has also been ample literature on international support for national 
violence. External sources can provide financial support, contribute foreign fighters and 
military assets, and boost morale, back political motivations, and provide information and 
technology in national insurgencies. Galula posits that external support is a critical 
element for successful popular mobilization for political violence. 75 
 
Unique Ideas 
 There are some findings that contradict Collier, Galula, and Petersen in unique 
literature like Chung-si Ahn’s cross causal analysis: Social Development and Political 
Violence. Through his research, Ahn found no evidence to support the theory that 
countries where social mobilization outruns the government’s capacity to meet welfare, 
and/or countries where social mobilization outruns political institutionalization leads to 
higher levels of instability. 76 Ahn also found that wealthier nations are not any more 
likely to have lower levels of political violence than those in lower levels of 
development.77 However, it is widely accepted that a combination of the discussed social 
dynamics, economic incentives, and political and institutional weakness are key drivers 
for why men rebel.  
 Amy Carpenter’s research in sectarian neighborhoods in Baghdad shed light on a 
fourth unique element of resiliency, which is community competence. Community 
75 Galula, D., Nagl, J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Pg. 25 
76 Ahn, C. (1984). Social development and political violence: a cross-national causal analysis.  
77 Ahn, C. (1984). Social development and political violence: a cross-national causal analysis. 
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competence is “about organized action of people, communities and institutions to 
prevent, manage, and learn from crisis.” 78 The principles of community competence are 
social issues in nature, but rather than representing an organic nature of resilience during 
conflict, competent communities demonstrate the capacity to apply lessons learned either 
from previous conflict resolution or through third sources.  
 Existing literature helps us understand social, political, and economic catalysts for 
instability. Galula, Peterson, Carpenter, and Collier all touch on similar key political, 
social, and economic markers that provide incentives and motivation for communities to 
partake in political violence—by acknowledging the presence of these elements in ‘non-
resilient’ communities, reverse logic tells us that most, if not all, of these elements will 
not be present in communities that are stable. In other words, there will not be a 
significant social, political, economic causes from which rebels can rally support; the 
government will have the capacity to function effectively enough to appease and control 
the population; there will be favorable geographic and development conditions for the 
counterinsurgent; there will be little or no external support for rebels; and there will not 
be norms encouraging participation in violence.  
 I acknowledge that even with the “right” social, political, and economic 
environment, fully extinguishing insurgency is an unlikely accomplishment. This chapter 
is not meant to be an exact blueprint for stability in Iraq, especially given the fluid nature 
of the country’s conflict. However, by identifying unique characteristics of stable and 
unstable areas in Iraq, policymakers could improve strategy to make counterinsurgency 
and stability operations more effective.  




                                                        
 
Theory & Hypothesis 
 Building on the literature described above, this paper aims to offer additional 
insight as to why Shi’a and Kurdish communities, which have been historically 
politically alienated and have poor development standards of living, are more stable 
today than Iraq’s Sunni regions. During insurgency and civil war, it is the objective of 
both the state and the insurgent to win control over the civilian population and get more 
bodies on their side by winning the hearts and minds of the citizens, forcing communities 
into passive or active agreement, or a combination of both tactics. In Iraq, however, the 
incumbent Shi’a central government has little social, political, and economic influence 
over many of Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish areas. Similarly, previous Sunni regimes had little 
influence on Iraq’s Shia and Kurdish regions. So what then, on a local level has 
distinguished traditionally vulnerable communities that have shied away from 
participation in violence, from traditionally vulnerable communities whose social fabrics 
have torn under sectarian pressure and surrounding violence in Iraq? Have humanitarian 
and development causes stemmed violence and instability?  
 I hypothesize that in operating environments like Iraq, national-level politics and 
economic dis/incentives to participate in violence are marginally important. Rather, the 
combination of two interconnected features has stemmed violence in traditionally 
vulnerable communities. First, insulated communities with a relatively homogenous 
population and culture allows for a strong social fabric not easily broken under pressure. 
Homogenous identity has, in essence, created a bubble around Kurdish and Shi’a 
communities to the point that they have coped with the surrounding war and violence 




Second, the presence of a local security force with a demonstrated capacity to protect, or 
at the very least provide citizens with a sense of security within their bubbles, lessens the 
appeal for extremists wishing to penetrate those communities. And, in the cases that 
insurgents do go try to appeal to these homogenous communities, citizens’ confidence in 
their local security forces will make them far less likely to seek security from alternative 
sources. Furthermore, insurgents attempting to infiltrate homogenous societies in which 
they do not organically identify with will be unlikely to be able to gain a popular support 
base among the civilian population.  
Methods 
 In this paper, I use qualitative analysis to compare three provinces from Iraq’s 
major partitions, which have all been politically alienated at some point over the last 20 
years. First, I analyze a Sunni dominated area; central and western Iraq have been home 
to a large amount of the violence plaguing Iraq over the last decade. Subsequently, I 
analyze two Shi’a and Kurdish provinces, which have remained relatively stable over the 
last decade despite close proximity to violence, and have demonstrated the capacity to 
prevent conflict escalation to the point where it would break down social order.  
 The first province I look at is Anbar, which has one of the most turbulent histories 
in Iraq over the last decade. The predominately Sunni province was the backbone of the 
Baathist regime, and had the strongest opposition to the U.S. invasion in the early 2000s. 
However, despite sharing the same faith as Sunni insurgents, many in Anbar rose to 
defend a Shia-led Iraq during the “Anbar Awakening.” The same tribes in Anbar are 




 The second province I examine is Muthanna. Although it is also close to areas of 
extreme violence, this primarily Shia town in southern Iraq has remained relatively stable 
against the backdrop of decades of violence in Iraq.  
 Third, I analyze at the Kurdish region of Duhok, which has managed to maintain 
social cohesiveness even after decades of political alienation, enduring serious human 
rights abuses, and bordering Mosul, one of the most contested areas in Iraq.  
Data/Case Studies: 
Anbar  
 Anbar is Iraq’s largest province, and is located west of Baghdad, bordering 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Over a million people live in the province, mostly 
clustered around the Western Euphrates River Valley. Anbar is almost completely 
inhabited by Sunni Muslims, and was historically the backbone for Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, as the province had close ties to the Baathist regime; many benefitted from 
Saddam’s corrupt policies favoring Sunnis.   
 During the early 2000s and the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Anbar 
served as an al Qaeda stronghold, and provided thousands of foreign fighters access to 
Iraq through the Western Euphrates river. The area largely opposed U.S. intervention —
Anbar and its neighboring provinces were the sites of the U.S. – Iraq War’s bloodiest 
battles. By 2006, Marine Corps assessments of the Anbar province were extremely 
pessimistic. 79 Many scholars note that between 2006 and 2008, a period known as the 
“Surge”—when the United States sent hundreds of thousands of additional troops into 
79 Linzer, D., Ricks, T. (2006). Marines' Outlook in Iraq: Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker. 
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Iraq — violence in Anbar plummeted. Some believe that this was largely because of the 
influx of American troops provided a stabilizing effect. More importantly, however, the 
U.S. began to pursue a strategy of tribal engagement in Anbar. The engagement strategy 
allowed many former Sunni insurgents, often called the Sons of Iraq, to “flip” and form 
an alliance with the U.S. coalition to fight extremists.  
 Although the surge and tribal engagement did have measurable successes, there is 
significant evidence that decreasing participation in violent extremism in Anbar predates 
the U.S. surge and that some Anbar tribes, especially the prominent Albu Mahal tribe, 
had become increasingly wary of al Qaeda’s violence and desired to drive the extremists 
out of their territory for years. Further, some Iraq scholars believe that the alliance of the 
Salmani tribe with al Qaeda was the final driver for rival tribes to form a counter-alliance 
with American forces.80 For these reason, clans led by Abd al-Sattar al-Rishaw (Abu 
Risha), who had actually started mobilizing against al Qaeda before the surge in 2004, 
seized the opportunity for American partnership at the time based on mutual interests.81 
According to the landmark 2006 study Iraq Tribal Study—al- Anbar Governate: The 
Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe, and the Albu Issa Tribe, these tribes “reject the 
fundamental al-Qaeda and Islamic State practice of declaring huge swaths of Sunnis as 
not real Muslims and therefore acceptable to kill.” 82 
 It is important to note that even though the Sons of Iraq partnered with the U.S. to 
fight al Qaeda, the group was, and still is, largely detached from the Shi’a central 
government in Baghdad. Anbar’s politics and society remain based on tribal customs and 
values, and local councils are largely in control of basic services. Unlike the Shi’a areas 
80 Western Iraq. The Institute for the Study of War  
81 Benraad, M. (2011). Iraq’s Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall. Middle East Policy Council, XVIII(1). 
82 Todd, L. (2006). Iraqi Tribal Study: Al-Anbar Governorate. Global Resources Group & Global Risk. 
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and the Badr brigades, which were mainly integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces in 
2004, Anbar’s Sunni local security forces are not part of the larger security apparatus in 
Iraq.83 In fact, not much of Anbar’s leadership or population was integrated into the 
national Iraqi system. Nour al Maliki’s government, like his predecessor, continued with 
the pattern of alienating Iraq’s citizens who were not aligned with his political party or a 
member of his sect. Any gains made in an effort to unify and stabilize Iraq during 2003 -
2014 were largely undone by the combination of Malaki’s political failures and 
detrimental spillover from the Syrian war.  
 According to the latest data from 2011, about 12.5 percent of the population in 
Anbar lives below the international poverty line of $2.5 U.S. dollars per day.84 Literacy 
rates are not necessarily low, with about 82 percent of the population being literate. 85 
The unemployment rate in Anbar is one of the highest in Iraq; about 18.1 percent of the 
economically active population is without jobs.86 
 According to Relief Web’s Inter-Agency Analysis Unit 2011 “Who Does What 
Where” report, about 81 to 90 percent of the population has access to improved drinking 
water sources. However, while access to basic services is widely available, the security 
situation in Anbar is by far the worst in the country. According to an Iraq Knowledge 
Survey taken in 2011, only 1.4 percent of households in Anbar perceived their 
households to be “very secure.” 87 In the Iraq Weekly Security Report, produced by the 
83 Through, there have been plans to integrate them.   
84 Governorate Profile: Anbar Iraq. (2014). Joint Analysis Unit. 
85 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey (2011). Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office (KRSO), Joint Analysis Unit (formerly Information and Analysis Unit). 
86 Governorate Profile: Anbar Iraq. (2014). Joint Analysis Unit.. 
87 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey (2011). Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office (KRSO), Joint Analysis Unit (formerly Information and Analysis Unit). Pg. 232. 
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defense contractor Triple Canopy, there were over 20 reported violent incidents in Anbar 
between April 14 and 20, 2015, the highest in the country.88 
Muthanna 
 Muthanna is a predominantly Shi’a town in southern Iraq that borders Saudi 
Arabia. Although it is also extremely close to areas of extreme violence, Muthanna has 
remained relatively stable against a backdrop of decades of economic and political 
alienation in Iraq. In 2010, the Center for Amy Lessons Learned handbook stated that 
“the province suffered from chronic underdevelopment since the 1980s… and 
consistently fares poorly according to humanitarian and development indicators.” 89 
Literacy rates are low, and only 63- 66 percent of the urban/rural population use an 
improved drinking water source.90 According to a study from Joint Analysis Unit (JAU) 
from 2011, about 29.4 percent of Muthanna’s population is below the national poverty 
line, which is three times the national level.91 The unemployment rate is in Muthanna is 
high- hovering at 14.5 percent. 92 
 The poor development of Muthanna over the past few decades is largely due to 
the fact that it was ignored and shorted of economic opportunity during Baathist rule in 
Saddam’s Iraq. Additionally, sanctions imposed on Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait during the First Gulf War during the 1990s likely further contributed to the lack 
of economic development. During this time, one could argue that the sanctions had little 
effect on the Baathist regime, as Saddam continued to maintain a lavish lifestyle, and 
88 Iraq Weekly Security Report. (2015). Triple Canopy, Secure Success. 
National and Provincial Data for Iraq. (2010). The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Center for Amy 
Lessons Learned. Appendix B.  
90 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit. Pg. 7. 
91 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit. Pg 7. 
92 Governorate Profile: Muthanna Iraq. (2013). Joint Analysis Unit. 
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keep those in his circles in Baghdad monetarily satisfied while the rest of the country was 
left starving in economic ruin; the southern Shi’a and northern Kurdish areas were 
particularly affected.  
 In addition to unfortunate economic conditions, Muthanna has historically been 
politically alienated. While Saddam Hussein and the Sunnis were in power, the Shi’a in 
in southern Iraq were generally left out of the political system. The most popular party in 
Muthanna is the Shi’a Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, with its militant wing, the Badr 
Corps, acting as its local security force.93 Throughout Saddam Hussein’s regime, the 
Shi’a political parties in southern Iraq, including the ISCI, were largely detached from 
Baghdad. In the 1990s during the Shi’a uprisings in the wake of the Gulf War, Saddam 
brutally crushed anyone challenging his authority. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and 
the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, many of the ISCI and Badr Corps members were 
incorporated into the newly established Iraqi government and, in 2004, were integrated 
into the security forces.94 On July 13, 2006, British, Australian, and Japanese forces fully 
handed over the security responsibility of Muthanna to the Iraqi forces.95  
 During the peak of violence in Iraq in 2006, Sunni militants blew up the al-Askari 
mosque in Samarra, a city North of Baghdad. Although this event was not close to 
Muthanna, many Shiites in southern Iraq mobilized to form an offensive. During this 
time, it is important to note that the populations of Muthanna did not choose to mobilize 
to participate in the violence.  
93 Fact Sheet on Iraq’s Major Political Parties and Militia Groups. (2008). Institute for the Study of War. 
94 Fact Sheet on Iraq’s Major Political Parties and Militia Groups. (2008). Institute for the Study of War. 
Pg. 3. 
95 National and Provincial Data for Iraq. (2010). The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Center for Amy 
Lessons Learned. Appendix B. 
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 According to Relief Web’s Inter-Agency Information and Analysis (IAU) “Who 
Does What Where” report, there were between 0-100 security incidents in Muthanna in 
2010.96 In fact, the province has the lowest number of security incidents in all of Iraq. In 
2011, the Iraq Knowledge Network Survey 2011 showed that 67.2 percent of households 
in Muthanna perceived their households to be ‘very secure’ (as opposed to very 
insecure/insecure/neither nor/secure/very insecure).97 This trend of security has continued 
over the last few years, even as Iraq as a whole has become more and more unstable as a 
result of spillover from the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIL. In a recent Iraq Weekly 
Security Report produced by the defense contractor Triple Canopy, there were no 
reported violent incidents in Muthanna between April 14 and 20, 2015. 98  
Duhok 
 Duhok province is located in northern Iraq on the border of Turkey, and is 
administered by the Kurdish Regional Government. Duhok also borders Ninewa province 
and Mosul, some of the most volatile areas in Iraq. This predominantly Kurdish and 
Assyrian town has endured decades of oppression, repression, and attempted genocide 
against their sects. Duhok, the rest of the Kurdish regions, have historically been 
politically alienated; during the early 1990s after the Gulf War, many of Iraq’s Kurds and 
Shi’a participated in rebellions across northern and southern Iraq against Saddam Hussein 
and his repressive regime. The Baathists and Saddam responded to the uprisings with 
crushing force, and thousands of Kurds died has a result of the Baathist regime’s use of 
chemical weapons against them.  
96 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit. Pg 9. 
97 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey (2011). Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office (KRSO), Joint Analysis Unit (formerly Information and Analysis Unit). Pg 232. 
98 Iraq Weekly Security Report. (2015). Triple Canopy, Secure Success. 
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 In 1991, an agreement between the Iraqi national government and the Kurds led to 
the establishment of a semi-autonomous region headed by the Kurdish Regional 
Government. Even with the agreement, the Iraqi government blocked humanitarian 
supplies and access to the Kurdish regions for years, including Duhok. After the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds continued to become even more separate 
from Iraq in everything but name. The Kurdish region, including Duhok, is completely 
separate from the Iraqi political, economic, and social systems. Duhok enjoys the 
protection of the local security force, the Kurdish Peshmerga.  
 Even with its turbulent history and alienation from Iraq, Duhok province has 
maintained a relatively low level of instability. The 2010 Center for Army Lessons 
Learned handbook describes the security situation in Duhok as “calm.”99 
 The 2010 Center for Army Lessons Learned handbook tells us that like 
Muthanna, Duhok does not perform well according to humanitarian and development 
indicators. 100  Education levels are low, and 6.1 percent of the labor force is 
unemployed. 101  Unemployment has been amplified over the last ten years, as an 
extremely high number of refugees displaced by the 2006- 2007 conflicts fled to Duhok; 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) make up about 21 percent of the province’s 
population. 102 
 Compared with the rest of Iraq, Duhok has a relatively low level of poverty. The 
latest data from the JAU measures the 4.9 percent of the population living below the 
99 National and Provincial Data for Iraq. (2010). The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Center for Amy 
Lessons Learned. Appendix B. 
100 National and Provincial Data for Iraq. (2010). The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Center for Amy 
Lessons Learned. Appendix B. 
101 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey (2011). Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office (KRSO), Joint Analysis Unit (formerly Information and Analysis Unit). Pg 84. 
102 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit. Pg. 1. 
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international poverty line on less than $2.5 U.S. dollars per day.103 Additionally, about 80 
- 90 percent of the urban/rural population uses an improved drinking water source. 104  
 According to Relief Web’s Inter-Agency Information and Analysis (IAU) “Who 
Does What Where” report, there were between 0-100 security incidents in Duhok in 
2010. 105 A survey taken in 2011 reported that 64.2 percent of households in Duhok 
perceived their households to be “very secure.” 106 This trend of low level of security 
incidents has continued over the last few years, even given the growing instability and 
proliferation of violence in Iraq generally. In Triple Canopy’s Iraq Weekly Security 
Report, there were between 1 – 4 security incidents in Duhok between April 14 and 20, 
2015. 107 
Findings 
 In Iraq, I hypothesize that the combination of two interconnected features has 
allowed communities that are considered “vulnerable” by COIN and development 
standards, to maintain an environment of relative stability. First, insulated communities 
with a relatively homogenous population and culture allows for a strong social fabric not 
easily broken under pressure. Homogenous identity has, in essence, created a bubble 
around Kurdish and Shi’a communities to the point that they have coped with the 
surrounding war and violence well enough to maintain social cohesiveness and prevent 
the breakdown of social order.  
103 Governorate Profile: Dahuk Iraq. (2013). Joint Analysis Unit. 
104 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit.Pg 7. 
105 Who Does What Where (3W). (June 2011).  Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit.. Pg 9. 
106 106 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey (2011). Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office (KRSO), Joint Analysis Unit (formerly Information and Analysis Unit). Pg 232.  
107 Iraq Weekly Security Report. (2015). Triple Canopy, Secure Success. 
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 Against the backdrop of decades of violence in Iraq, Muthanna has consistently 
been a bright spot, with the exception of a few skirmishes. With large numbers of 
impoverished people, high levels of unemployment, preexisting political alienation 
issues, and close proximity to violence, Muthanna should be considered a high risk for 
violence. With a closer look at the Muthanna’s history, however, it is evident that its 
homogeneity has undoubtedly contributed to its stability. Before, during, and after the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Muthanna’s population continues to be made up of mostly Shi’a 
Arabs aligned with Iranian social and religious leaders. The region’s relative 
estrangement from Iraq during the Saddam Hussein’s regime caused a schism in the 
provinces nationalist identity. As a result, many of the Shi’a in Muthanna aligned their 
political and social values with the ISCI group, which is supported by Iran, and shied 
away from Baghdad. 
It is important to note that although Iraqis in ISCI and the Badr Corps are 
empathetic to Iran, many of the Shi’a in Muthanna and Iraq’s southern regions very much 
identify as Arab Iraqis, not Persians. The caveat, however, is that many of these Shi’a 
Iraqis do not identify with Sunni Iraqis. It is for this reason that Saddam historically never 
had much social influence on the southern regions; similarly, Sunni extremists will never 
be able to build a popular civilian support base in Muthanna and the rest of the Shi’a 
south.   
 Similar to the Shi’a in Muthanna, the Kurds in Iraq’s northern regions, including 
Duhok, have been a bright spot over the past decade. Despite complete political 
alienation and enduring a genocide inflicted by the Baathist regime, Kurds, especially 




Duhok’s political and social alienation from Baghdad during the Saddam Hussein era 
accentuated an already separate Kurdish identity. Even with the fall of Saddam in 2003 
and the establishment of a new government in Iraq, the Kurdish population remains 
largely separate from Iraq in everything but name. Lack of organic, shared identity is the 
main reason that the incumbent Sunni violent extremist group, ISIL, will never be able to 
build a popular support base among civilians in this region.  
 Reinforcing stability in Muthanna and Duhok is the presence of local security 
forces with a demonstrated capacity to protect, or at the very least provide citizens with a 
sense of security within their respective bubbles. In Muthanna, the Badr Corps — ISCI’s 
militant wing — has had a presence in the province since the 1980s. After the 
establishment of the new Iraqi government after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the 
Badr Corps, once an outlawed militia, was largely integrated into the Iraqi Security 
Forces. In Duhok, the Peshmerga, who have been around since the 1950s, is the military 
force for Iraqi Kurdistan. The Peshmerga have earned a robust reputation regarding their 
ability to provide security to Duhok and other Kurdish provinces, and there is no doubt 
among Iraq watchers that this has had a stabilizing effect in this region. 
 Comparing the relatively stable areas of Muthanna and Duhok with Iraq’s most 
contested province, Anbar, a few new points are brought to light; like Muthanna and 
Duhok, the indigenous population in Anbar is also almost completely homogenous and 
made up of Iraqi Sunnis. However, over the past decade, there has been a huge increase 
in violence and extremism throughout the province with a few notable exceptions. One 
possible explanation for the increase in violence aligns with the logic of the first part of 




Western Euphrates river brought in violently opposing groups of people to Iraq. During 
the stabilization of Anbar province and the Anbar Awakening, similar tribes with 
harmonized interests and connected identities formed alliances against what they 
considered to be “non-Iraqi.” Like the populations in Muthanna and Duhok, the Sons of 
Iraq found their strength in the resilience of their community networks and social fabrics. 
While a significant number tribes in Anbar have mobilized as active counterinsurgents 
against extremists, it is important to note that unlike Muthanna and Duhok, extremists 
like the Islamic State do share a common, historical identity with many Anbaris. For 
years, insurgents have embedded themselves in the local community; for example, AQI 
started tying themselves to Anbari tribal leaders’ families very early on so that they 
would become part of the social landscape. 108 It is for this reason that many Sunni 
extremists are able to find refuge and support among the Anbari population.  
 Additionally, unlike Muthanna and Duhok, there are few formidable security 
forces, which Anbaris believe could legitimately provide security from extremists and 
other threats. The Iraqi Security Forces do not have a strong presence in Anbar, and the 
Sons of Iraq are out numbered and out gunned by their rivals.  The absence of a 
legitimate security force that could counter extremists in Anbar and protect its inhabitants 
is a prominent driver in Anbar’s instability. 
Conclusion 
 Theories discussed in the literature review of this chapter point out that the lower 
the level of economic development, the higher the risk of insurgency. Collier’s statistical 
analysis in his book The Bottom Billion found that poor economic conditions, lack of 
108 Kilcullen, D. (2007). Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt. Small Wars Journal. 
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social and educational programs, and poor public health all contribute to instability in 
areas in which insurgencies thrive. 109 Literature from this chapter also indicates that 
insurgencies and instability thrive in areas that are largely politically alienated and 
discontented. With chronic underdevelopment, high illiteracy rates, and political 
alienation for decades during the Saddam era, Duhok and Muthanna are textbook recipes 
for disaster.  
 Yet, as evidenced by the statistics for security incidents in both provinces, these 
areas currently have the lowest levels of violence in Iraq. This analysis of the historical 
and current dynamics in Anbar, Muthanna, and Duhok show that national-level politics 
and economic dis/incentives to participate in violence are marginally important. Rather, 
in Iraq’s hyper-sectarian operating environment, the combination of two interconnected 
features have been the largest stabilizing factors. First, insulated communities with a 
relatively homogenous population and culture in Muthanna and Duhok allows for a 
strong social fabric not easily broken under pressure. Homogenous identity in these two 
regions has created a bubble around Kurdish and Shi’a communities to the point that they 
have coped with the surrounding war and violence well enough to maintain social 
cohesiveness and prevent the breakdown of social order. On the other hand, Anbar has 
suffered a huge influx of foreign fighters and other factors that have empowered 
extremists. In this lose- lose situation, the proliferation of Sunni extremism in Anbar has 
further divided the Anbari population, while building its popular support base among the 
rest of Anbar’s Sunnis and embedding themselves in the local community.  Second, 
Muthanna and Duhok enjoy the presence and protection of a capable security force.  
109 Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion : why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done 
about it.  
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 Though this study shows some similarities between Iraq’s stable regions, there are 
extraordinary social, political, economic, religious, and military differences between the 
sects. It has been nearly a century since British administrators drew Iraq’s borders, but 
Iraqis have yet to form a true sense of shared nationhood and identity. Stability and 
counterinsurgency operations over the last decade show us that foreign interventions can 
provide some short-term and/or superficial security gains, but the proliferation of 
extremism and instability brings to light a hard reality. As Colonel Wilson, a British 
military officer in charge of drawing Iraq’s border’s said, “What we are up against is 
anarchy plus fanaticism. There is little to no nationalism.” 110 
 The regions in Iraq that have enjoyed stability have done so by socially and 
militarily preserving their sub-national identities. Ultimately, a true unity of Iraq can only 
be achieved if there is genuine will and efforts of Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds to do 
so. The U.S. and international community can help this potential outcome materialize by 
empowering Iraqis to have an inclusive government and diverse security apparatus, 
which should eventually be self-sustaining. As of Spring 2015, that is the objective of the 
Obama administration. Still, 100 years after the formation of Iraq, there is little indication 
that the majority of Iraq’s Shi’a, Kurds, and Sunnis identify with their fellow Iraqis. The 
future will hard to predict given the fluidity of the current situation in Iraq, but going 
forward, it is important to be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground and the limits of 
foreign intervention and assistance. If the status quo continues, empowering the Iraqis to 
redraw their own lines in the sand may be the best way forward to achieve stability in 
Iraq. In his book Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for 




                                                        
 
the Post-Colonial States, Michael Rear suggests that the right to self determination should 
be given to populations instead of territories. He writes, if homogeneity is not a legitimate 
basis for separate state as in the case of the republics of the former Yugoslavia or in Iraq, 
how can it be a rationale for separate states for the French and German?111   
  
111 Rear, M. (2008). Intervention, ethnic conflict and state-building in Iraq : a paradigm for the post-




                                                        
 
CHAPTER THREE: American Strategic Culture and 
Counterinsurgency in Iraq 
 
How did American historical tendencies shape U.S. strategy in Iraq from 2003-2011? 
How did it adapt? 
Introduction 
 General Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized 
in the early 90s that globalization would not only shape international politics and 
economics, but would also have an impact on the international strategic landscape. With 
the Cold War coming to an end and the memory of Vietnam still fresh, Powell and his 
team aimed to modify U.S. force planning to better address future threats. The guidelines 
that Powell and his team created, coined the ‘Powell Doctrine,’ was created in order to 
encourage civilian leaders to exercise extreme restraint on using the U.S. military in an 
open-ended manner without a realistic and actionable military means to an end. The 
doctrine identified a need for a flexible base force that could participate in peacekeeping 
and humanitarian operations, and had the capability to combat emerging threats that 
operated in a completely different manner than America’s traditional enemies.      
 Three decades earlier, Henry Kissinger wrote, “Each generation is permitted only 
one effort of abstraction; it can attempt only one interpretation and a single experiment, 
for it is its own subject. This is the challenge of history and its tragedy.”112 Kissinger’s 
point suggests that “interpretations and experiments” change with the generations. Yet, 
American strategic culture has remained relatively constant since the creation of an all-
volunteer, conventional force in 1973. U.S. history and prior U.S. engagement in war has 
shaped an iconic model for the recruitment, training, ethical standards, thinking, and 
112 Kissinger, H. (1973). A world restored. 
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fighting style of the U.S. military; generations after generations training with similar 
values, structure, and practices has led to a distinct strategic culture and ‘American Way 
of War.’ The definition of strategic culture is generally described as “the role of cultural 
influences, influences on how political entities judge the proper time to employ force, 
ways of using force during a conflict, and ways of determining the best time to terminate 
conflict.113 Essentially, U.S. strategic culture is the American way of war, which has been 
established based on the historical experiences that have shaped the way the U.S. fights 
and approaches conflict. 
 “The same primacy that has yielded conventional deterrence, however, has 
pushed America’s enemies into greater reliance on irregular warfare responses that 
expose the limits of conventional primacy.”114 September 11, 2001 permanently altered 
the strategic landscape to something radically different than the traditional environment 
in which the U.S. was accustomed to operating in. Because of this, traditional ground 
forces have been forced more than ever to adapt in order to navigate uncharted territory 
to carry out missions outside their traditional scope of work;115 the Iraq war and ongoing 
conflict provides a valuable case to examine the U.S. armed forces true ability to do this.   
 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was designed to topple the Saddam Hussein 
regime, implement democracy, and exit Iraq as quickly as possible in order to leave a 
“light footprint.” However, the anticipated scenario in Iraq quickly disappeared with the 
proliferation of insurgency and terrorism, and the violent dissolution of the country into 
sectarian conflict. Due to lack of initial planning for the post Saddam environment, the 
113 Lauterbach, T. (2011) Constructivism, Strategic Culture, and the Iraq War. U.S. Air Force. 
114 Record, J. (2006). The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency. 
115 The Marine Corps and Army Special Forces are a notable exception. 
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U.S. military was unprepared and ill equipped to engage in the ensuing war. It is because 
of this that most of the world reflects on the American experience in Iraq as one of the 
biggest strategic blunders in American history. 
 Recognizing that the conflict in Iraq could not be solved by traditional military 
means alone, and required gaining significant support and control of the population, 
capacity building, and restructuring in order to counter the insurgency and its support 
base, leadership sought a new strategy. Thus, strategic thinkers and leaders, attempted to 
shift the U.S. strategy in Iraq to prioritize population security and increase efforts to 
address root political and social grievances. General David Petraeus sought to 
operationalize these principles, commonly referred to as ‘COIN’ or Field Manual 3-24 
(FM 3-24).  
 The ideas in FM 3-24 are certainly not ground-breaking. Political Scientist 
Lorenzo Zambernardi points out in his essay Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma, 
that the fundamentals of Petraeus’s strategy are rooted in the philosophies of French 
strategist David Galula, 20th century British officer T.E. Lawrence, Mao Zedong, and a 
variety of counterrevolutionary strategists.116  However, operationalizing FM 3-24 and 
the U.S. armed forces attempt to shift away from the traditional way that they fight way 
was ground-breaking. FM 3-24 has since deeply informed how the U.S. military should 
fight, and hopefully win, irregular wars like those in Iraq. The manual advises against 
attempting to impose ideals of normalcy regarding foreign cultural issues, and ensures 
that the desires of the locals take precedence. Nevertheless, any nation’s ability to 
operationalize any strategy is dependent on the institutional capacity to do so. This is 
evident in the case of Iraq. In this chapter, I objectively analyze how American strategic 
116 Zambernardi, L. (2010). Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma. 
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cultural shaped U.S. strategy, in its various phases, in Iraq from 2003-2011. I hypothesize 
even with the positive shift in strategy, institutional norms, which are part of traditional 
U.S. strategic culture, subverted the ability of U.S. armed forces to effectively engage in 
counterinsurgency in Iraq. Thus, the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in Iraq were limited.  
Literature Review 
 There are many scholars who have applied the notion of strategic culture to 
explain continuity and/or change in national security policies. Thomas Mahnken, a 
Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve and a scholar on strategy, writes “A nation’s 
strategic culture flows from its geography and resources, history and experience, and 
society and political structure. It represents an approach that a given state has found 
successful in the past.”117 In his work, Mahnken posits that there are three useful levels of 
which to consider strategic culture: those of the nation, the military, and the military 
service. 118   Mahnkens multi-level framework through which to analyze a nation’s 
strategic culture is adopted in this paper: For the purpose of this chapter, this literature 
review examines strategic culture on the “military level.” Essentially this means the way 
a nation wants to fight wars, though practice may not always reflect this. In Mahnken’s 
words “Although practice does not have to confirm this desire, success in waging wars 
that run counter to national ways of war may come only after a period of painful 
adaptation.”119 
 One of the first, pivotal studies examining American strategic culture at the 
military level is historian Russell Weigley’s work  “The American Way of War: A 
117 Mahnken, T. (2006) U.S. Strategic Culture. Pg. 3 
118 Mahnken, T. (2006) U.S. Strategic Culture. Pg. 5 
119 Mahnken, T. (2006) U.S. Strategic Culture. Pg. 5 
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History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy.” In his book, Weigley details 
historical military engagements, geographical isolation, the complete domination of the 
Western hemisphere, and how the development of American exceptionalism created an 
American way of strategic thinking and habitual behaviors that many members of the 
national security community share.  
 Colin Gray, a British strategist, builds on Weigley’s foundation, and identifies 13 
distinct characteristics of the American way of war.  These 13 characteristics are: 
Apolitical, Astrategic, Ahistorical, Problem-Solving and Optimistic, Culturally Ignorant, 
Technologically Dependent, Firepower Focused, Large Scale, Aggressive and Offensive, 
Profoundly Regular, Impatient, Logistically Excellent, and Sensitivity to Casualties.120 
Most, if not all, of the majority of literature describing American strategic culture fits into 
the following categories.  
 
Apolitical: Americans tend to characterize states of war and peace as separate conditions. 
This tendency is deeply rooted American history, as the latter half the 20th century 
involved a bipolar strategic environment and traditional military threats.  In these 
conflicts and due to the traditional nature of the threat—Vietnam as a notable 
exception—civilian policymakers and the U.S. military alike viewed military victory as a 
means to an end. As Colin Gray points out in his essay, this mindset “neglects the 
Clausewitzian dictum that war is about, and only about, its political purposes. 
120 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 30 
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Characteristically, though certainly not invariably, U.S. military efforts have not been 
suitably cashed in the coin of political advantage.” 121 
 
Astrategic: Strategy is a plan of action that is carried out in order to achieve an objective. 
The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage clearly differentiates 
between “national strategy” and “military strategy:” 
 
 National Strategy is the art and science of developing and using political, 
economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed 
forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.  
  
 Military Strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of 
a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of 
force, or threat of force. 122 
 
 For now, let us consider military strategy and the definition provided by the 
Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage; Gray’s essay asserts that American 
strategic culture relies largely on the tactical, decisive use of military force as a main 
strategy to achieve objective in war, regardless if the type of conflict is traditional or 
asymmetric. 123 Assuming that countering an insurgency requires the military to pursue 
lines of effort other than the application of force or threat of force, it is important to note 
that by definition, these lines of effort do not fit under traditional “military strategy.” 
 
121 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 30 
122 Weigley, R. (1977). The American way of war : a history of United States military strategy and policy. 
Pg. xvii 
123 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 31 
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Ahistorical: A challenge in any geopolitical and/or strategic affair is to take into 
consideration what history teaches us. Gray points out in his essay that although the U.S. 
military has an extensive history dealing with irregular warfare, the experiences were 
never, until FM 3-26, used to apply lessons learned and create a comprehensive doctrine 
to inform, train, and equip the U.S. Army with the specialized skills necessary for 
irregular warfare. Because of this, Gray points out the U.S. Army has historically had to 
improvise in irregular warfare, and sometimes just wage regular war against irregulars.124 
 
Problem-Solving and Optimistic: Gray states that American strategic culture follows the 
“problem-solving faith, the penchant for the engineering fix.” 125 With this view on 
warfare, American strategy tends to view insurrection itself as a problem, or something 
that is directly fixable itself. While it is true that in an insurgency is a “problem” for the 
regime it opposes, an insurgency really represents a larger set of conditions that have 
given that insurgency a raison d’etre.  
 In his book America's strategic future : a blueprint for national survival in the 
new millennium, H.P. Van Tuyll, also points out a problem-solving attitude regarding war 
in American strategic culture. He writes, “Americans look for simple answers, clear and 
straightforward solutions, and interventions with artificial time limits. These attitudes 
come from geography and history, not ignorance. The U.S. was virtually invulnerable 
until the advent of planes and missiles with intercontinental capabilities.” 126 
124 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 32 
125 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 33 




                                                        
 
 
Culturally Ignorant: Gray writes, “Cultural insensitivity… continues to hamper American 
strategic performance.”127 Because the battle space during a counterinsurgency campaign 
is largely in the minds of the people, whose support both the counterinsurgent and 
insurgent alike are trying to win, understanding the enemy and target population is truly 
key. The battles that the U.S. has found itself engaged in over the last decade in the 
Middle East require dealing with both an enemy and a population that have a completely 
different mind than that of an American military strategist. Van Tuyll makes a similar 
observation and brings to light an objective reality: “Nationalist Revolutionaries were 
classified according to American Cold War perceptions, with little regard for the reasons 
that caused those revolutionaries to revolt in the first place.”128 
 
Technologically Dependent: It is universally accepted that the U.S. possesses the most 
capable and technologically savvy military in the entire world. American airpower has 
given the U.S. a unique tactical advantage in warfare, and will continue to do so in the 
future. However, the utility of airpower and technology in counterinsurgency and 
irregular warfare is limited. Gray writes, “The experience of several countries 
demonstrates unambiguously that there is no correlation between technical sophistication 
and success in the conduct of warfare against irregulars.”129 Of course, this is not to say 
that the U.S. should not take advantage of unique American air power. Rather, current 
127 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 35 
128 Van Tuyll, H. (1998). America's strategic future: a blueprint for national survival in the new 
millennium.  
129 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 36 
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scholarship points out that the overuse or overreliance on technology in 
counterinsurgency can be detrimental to success of the overall campaign.    
 
Firepower Focused: Like technology, the U.S. possesses the strongest and most powerful 
weapons in the world. Because firepower is one of America’s best assets, is logical to 
take advantage of this and heavily utilize firepower when American engages in war; Gray 
writes: 
“It has long been the American way in warfare to send metal in harm’s 
way in place of vulnerable flesh. This admirable expression of the 
country’s machine-mindedness undoubtedly is the single most 
characteristic feature of American war-making at the sharp end. 
Needless to say, perhaps, a devotion to firepower, while defensible, 
indeed necessary, cannot help encouraging the armed forces to rely on 
it even when other modes of military behavior would be more 
suitable.” 130  
 
Gray highlights a key point that the majority of counterinsurgency literature agrees on—
in order to fully counter an insurgency it is necessary for the military to pursue other lines 
of effort, rather than firepower, as there are often more suitable tactics. Especially in the 
cases of irregular conflict in which firepower is used indiscriminately, it can readily 
become self-defeating. 131 
 
Large Scale: German military historian Hans Delbrück suggests that there are two kinds 
of military strategy: “Strategy of annihilation; and the strategy of attrition.” 132 Weigley 
writes that in American history, a strategy of annihilation is characteristic of the 
130 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 37 
131 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 37 




                                                        
 
American way of war.133 The U.S. has historically been successful in fighting big wars, 
in a big way. America’s first experience fighting in this way began with its entry into 
World War 1; the U.S. was able to fight and destroy opposing armies due to a distinct 
advantage in terms of sheer size, material wealth, technological advantages, and more. 134 
However, size, material wealth, and technological advantages provide reduced benefit 
when fighting poor, irregular guerillas that have serious other-than-military-arsenal.  
 
Aggressive and Offensive: In the 20th century, because of America geography and 
culture, the U.S. repeatedly joined wars that were already well underway. Geographical 
isolation required substantial initiative to move men and material across oceans. 
Nevertheless, American’s role as an international superpower and protector has obliged 
the U.S. to commit to offensive operations in order to take back the gains made by 
enemies in Europe and Asia.135  
 
Profoundly Regular: Gray points out that American soldiers have been overwhelmingly 
regular in their view of, approach to, and skill in, warfare. Largely due to U.S. history, 
the training of the majority of the Armed Forces has focused on combatting symmetrical, 
regular enemies. The only units, however, have largely focused on irregular warfare are 
the Special Forces (SOF). Gray writes, “The SOF are America’s irregular regulars.” 136 
 
133 Weigley, R. (1977). The American way of war : a history of United States military strategy and policy. 
Pg. xvii 
134 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 39 
135 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 42 
136 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 43 
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Impatient: Technological advantages, large-scale warfare, aggressiveness, and a problem 
solving attitude combine to form an ‘impatient’ military and general public. Additionally, 
swift and decisive military successes in U.S. military history have influenced Americans 
to approach warfare as “a regrettable occasional evil that has to be concluded as 
decisively and rapidly as possible.” 137 Historical examples of the use of force against 
traditional enemies offer a promise of tangible, quick success. Additionally, media 
reporting hugely influences the American public, Congress, and support for policies that 
provide visible, tactical successes. However, an irregular war cannot be won by swift 
military action alone, and as the Army knows, is a protracted ordeal. 138 
 
Logistically Excellent: Logistics is the process of supply and movement of resources that 
makes something possible. Due to geographic isolation, Americans have had no choice 
but to become skilled in logistics, in order to make any involvement in war overseas 
possible and worth the cost. The American way of war prefers a huge amount of 
equipment, arms, support, and protection; thus, America tends to have a heavy logistical 
footprint. This is unlikely to change, and as Gray points out, “It is difficult to envisage 
serious measures to lighten the logistical footprint, given concerns about reenlistment, 
political pressures from soldiers’ relatives, and soldier-citizens’ notions of their 
rights.” 139 
  
137 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 45 
138 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 45 
139 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 47 
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Sensitive to Casualties: The U.S. military is known for a keen emphasis on force 
protection. This completely logical aversion to casualty can be broken down into three 
goals. First, like any nation, the U.S. wants as few American lives lost as possible when 
engaging in war. Second, professional soldiers are expensive to train and expensive to 
replace. Third, the American public has an aversion to casualties, and the loss of public 
support for a lethal foreign undertaking will inevitably guide policy. Among other things, 
American sensitivity to casualties is linked to the ‘impatience’ characteristic, as the U.S. 
has an aversion to protracted conflict. Additionally, sensitivity to casualties is another 
reason why technology is so heavily relied upon by the U.S. military; why send an 
American man or service woman into harms way when you can send a machine? 140   
  
Other Considerations: Although the majority of literature on American strategic culture 
outlines the 13 aforementioned categories in some capacity, Max Boot’s alternative 
interpretation deserves mention. In his book, Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of 
American Power, Boot argues that the U.S. has actually been involved in more small, 
asymmetric wars than large traditional conflicts; thus, Boot contends that the American 
way of war can also involve “inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving 
pacification, and benefitting from profiteering.” 141  Still, Boot’s interpretation shares 
some judgments with the Gray, Van Tuyll, and Weigley with regard to American 
difficulty in turning military gains into strategic, political victories.   
 
140 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 47 
141 Echevarria, A. An American War of War or Way of Battle? Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. 
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 With the U.S.’s historical focus on high intensity conflict, it is unsurprising that 
the U.S. armed forces have struggled in counterinsurgency and stability operations. 
Career Army officer and military strategist Andrew Krepinevich points out that COIN 
and stability operations clash with the fundamental strengths of the U.S. military and 
strategic culture: The emphasis is on light infantry formations, not heavy divisions; on 
firepower restraint, not it’s wide spread application; on the resolution of political and 
social problems within the nation targeted by insurgents, not closing with and destroying 
the insurgent’s field forces.”142  
 The idea of military adaptation is a pressing and evolving issue that the U.S. 
military institution will continue to confront. Williamson Murray writes, “History 
suggests that military organizations have been more committed to the ethos of the past 
than to preparing to meet the future.”143 David Ucko also points out that prior to U.S. 
military’s “learning of counterinsurgency, the institution previously marginalized such 
operations in favor in high intensity combat operations.” 144  Even though General 
Petraeus did lead a reorientation at the strategic and operational level of U.S. armed 
forces to engage in counterinsurgency operations, there Department of Defense, as an 
institution has largely kept the same norms and priorities for the last few decades. To this 
end, Ucko writes, “the U.S. military remained, even during the heights of the surge in 
Iraq, an institution oriented predominantly toward major combat operations and unwilling 
to upset entrenched priorities and spending patterns.”145   
142 Krepinevich, A. DoD, Directive 3000.05. 
143 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 3 
144 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars.  
Pg. 169 




                                                        
 
 Murray’s findings offer similar conclusions as Ucko. In his research, Murray 
found that at the operational and tactical levels, American commanders and soldiers 
seemed able to adapt to scenarios on the ground. However, at higher levels, this was 
hardly the case. Murray writes:  
 “While the adaptation of American soldiers and marines to the 
immediate tactical situations they confronted in immediate aftermath of 
the war was effective, the performance of their more senior leaders in 
handling a growing insurgency at the operational and political levels 
was…inept and at times incoherent.”146 
 
Military adaptation remains a challenge that deserves further analysis and fresh ideas.  
Tactical, operational, and technological adaptation in war is important, but it is critical for 
military and political leaders to also determine strategic and political parameters.147 Old 
habits and institutional preferences to fight in a high-intensity, conventional style have 
largely worked in conventional style conflicts; however, as Murray points out, “it is 
unlikely that America’s opponents will prove so foolish as to challenge the U.S. and its 
military forces in the arena of conventional military operations.” 148  Thus, it will be 
critical to think of adaptation from not only the technological and tactical war fighting 
spheres, but also in terms of from cultural, political, and intellectual spheres.149    
Theory & Hypothesis 
 It is clear from existing literature that the American strategic culture has distinct 
characteristics that shaped military strategy during the conflict in Iraq. This chapter 
assesses how American historical tendencies guided initial U.S. strategy in Iraq, then 
146 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 73 
147 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 311 
148 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 312 
149 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 311 
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assesses the shift in strategy and adaptation of the armed forces to counterinsurgency. 
Through its various phases, I hypothesize that U.S. strategic cultural norms, or “old 
think,” limited institutional adaptation of counterinsurgency. Thus, even though one can 
argue that COIN was successfully implemented at the operational and tactical level, there 
Department’s stated priorities reflect entrenched biases about the ‘appropriate’ American 
way of war.   
Methods 
 I chose to study Iraq because the lessons learned about relevant skills and 
capabilities when engaging in irregular warfare are becoming increasingly important as 
the U.S. engages in modern wars. It is useful for policymakers and strategists to be aware 
of how American historical tendencies shaped strategy in Iraq, so that detrimental or 
beneficial lessons can be learned and applied during future engagement in irregular 
warfare in the country. For the second part of the analysis, David Ucko provides a useful 
framework for understanding the U.S. armed forces adaptation to counterinsurgency. 
Building on his research in his book The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the 
U.S. Military for Modern Wars, I analyze the reorientation of the military to 
counterinsurgency on two levels: first at the operational learning level; and second, at the 
institutional level.  
 In order to analyze these dynamics, I use qualitative data gathered from the 
analysis of U.S. strategy in Iraq to determine how American strategic culture shaped 
strategy in the Invasion of Iraq.  Specifically, I look for links between the established 




invade Iraq, overthrow the Baathist regime, implement democracy, and swiftly exit the 
country.   
 Then, I analyze how the armed forces attempted to reorient strategically in order 
to better engage in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2010). I hypothesize that 
during the New Way Forward and attempt to adapt to irregular warfare, the armed forces 
were able to adapt at the strategic and operational learning level, but not institutionally; 
the institutional adaptation of the Department of Defense to the counterinsurgency 
movement was hampered by old think and biases stemming from the traditional 
American way of war. 
 If my hypothesis proves correct, there will be clear link between old think, which 
places emphasis on high intensity, traditional combat operations 150  in the Defense 
Department’s indicated priorities.  This has an unfortunate effect on the ability and 
readiness of U.S. forces to engage in counterinsurgency.  
Data/ Case Study 
The Iraq War (2003- 2011) 
 A complete account of the American strategy in Iraq begins with the decision to 
invade Iraq in the first place, and the factors that led policymakers to this decision. While 
the Iraq war began in March of 2003, arguments for and against rationale of invading Iraq 
began years before. The U.S. was already in an extremely sensitive environment in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks, and Saddam Hussein’s alleged connection to the al 
Qaeda was an alarming concern to many in the U.S.    
150 Also known as “The American Way of War” 
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 In a well-documented account of the years before the Iraq War, the U.S. 
intelligence community, with the exception of the State Department Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, estimated that Saddam Hussein had, and was acquiring more, 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for malicious use. Intelligence focused on 
collection and analysis of the technical aspects of Iraqi air defense systems. The Kerr 
group, a collection of former Central Intelligence Agency analysts assigned to critically 
review the intelligence process related to the Iraq War, found that there was ample 
intelligence and analysis on Iraqi political and cultural implications in war, but policy 
makers paid little attention to it. U.S. strategists and policymakers alike focused on 
analysis of technological intelligence in order to assess how Saddam intended to use his 
WMD. Intelligence suggested that Saddam did, indeed have a large amount of WMD at 
one point, thus, the intelligence and policy community uses this as an indication that 
Saddam Hussein was planning on using the WMD, based on his stockpile and potential 
capability.  
 Iraq was already enduring sanctions from the UN that at the time, seemed to be 
failing. There was a false sense in Washington that Saddam Hussein was planning to ally 
his regime with al Qaeda; the possibility of a rouge regime equipped with weapons of 
mass destruction aligning with terrorists and politicized intelligence provided President 
George W. Bush, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, and his advisors 
to build a strong case for war. 
 In October 2002, Congress authorized a resolution for war in Iraq, and six months 
later, on March 19, 2003, American and coalition forces invaded. In a televised address to 




the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the 
world from grave danger.” 151  Initial U.S. operations in Iraq followed a traditional 
approach to warfare, and focused on destroying military infrastructure and weapons 
systems. The goal of President Bush and Rumsfeld was to leave a “light footprint” in 
Iraq, and in this regard, the strategy was different than previous “total war” approaches to 
conflict. Accordingly,, initial U.S. war planning only included three lightweight infantry 
divisions with one backup made up of Marine and Coalition forces.152 But what began as 
a more traditional-style conflict to defeat a traditional-style enemy and remove Saddam 
Hussein from power turned into a decade-long counterinsurgency and stability operations 
mission.  
 Shortly after the U.S. invasion, Saddam Hussein went into hiding and U.S. and 
coalition forces were able to capture Baghdad. On May 1, 2003, just over a month after 
U.S. forces first entered Iraq, President Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations.153 However, what President Bush, his advisors, and the U.S. forces in Iraq 
were not prepared for was the proliferation of insurgency and powerful guerrilla warfare 
that swept the country after the military defeat of Iraq’s conventional forces.  
 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was stood up 
10 weeks prior to the invasion in order to lead post war planning in Iraq, but the 
organization had little impact due to an extremely short, impractical timeline. Difficulties 
increased, and Iraq soon slid into chaos with warring Sunni and Shia insurgent groups 
destabilizing the post invasion environment. Despite pre-war planning and the Bush 
administration’s stated intentions that the U.S. intended to leave a light footprint and 
151 War in Iraq Begins. (2003). The History Channel. 
152 Ricks, T. E. (2006). Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq. Pg. 117 
153 War in Iraq Begins. (2003). The History Channel. 
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would not engage in nation building, on May 6, 2003, President Bush announced that 
Paul Bremner would head an interim government in Iraq until the Iraqis could hold 
democratic elections. The interim government, called the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), then began a process called de-Baathification, to remove former leaders from 
Saddam’s regime from their government posts and block them from obtaining new ones; 
some were offered a chance to keep their jobs if they cooperated with U.S. forces. In 
addition to de-Baathification, Bremner also dissolved the Iraqi security forces and police 
forces.  
 Accordingly, many of the Iraqi political and military leaders offered to cooperate 
with the U.S. in hopes of keeping their jobs and retaining the Sunni’s share in Iraq’s 
decision-making apparatus. Most of these offers were rejected, however, as U.S. 
strategists saw former regime officials keeping their ranks as a potential threat to Iraq’s 
transition to a new democratic government. The CPA continued on to alienate most of 
Iraq’s Baathists despite initial promises to make efforts to include them in the political 
transition; unfortunately many of these disgruntled, freshly unemployed, and powerful 
Sunnis joined forces with extremists to form a massive insurgency challenging coalition 
forces.  Violence continued to worsen with many of Iraq’s Sunnis continuing to side with 
terrorist organizations, and Iraq’s newly elected, Shiite dominated government closely 
aligning with Iran. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) bombing of the Samarra mosque, one of the 
holiest sites in Shia Islam, served as unquestionable proof that insurgent and sectarian 
violence in Iraq had reached an extreme level.  
 The gravity of the situation in Iraq eventually led President Bush and his 




called the Iraq Study Group to conduct an assessment; the report concluded, “Despite a 
massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive, and the situation is deteriorating… The 
ability of the U.S. to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.”154 It was also 
clear to U.S. policymakers that there were not enough troops to stabilize Iraq, and that 
there needed to be a major effort to win over Iraq’s vulnerable Sunni populations so that 
they would not be pushed towards to join the insurgency. The Iraq Group Study’s report 
provided recommendations for diplomatic lines of effort that called for cooperation with 
Iraq’s neighbors for border security, dialogue with all parties of influence in Iraq (except 
terrorist organizations), and achieving political milestones.155  
 In addition to political lines of effort, the Iraq Study Group recommended several 
military lines of effort that focused on training, advising, and equipping the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF). The report also suggested that high priority be given to “professional 
language proficiency and cultural training.”156 In an effort to address these problems, 
President Bush and General David Petraeus adopted “COIN” as the new 
counterinsurgency strategy. COIN, outlined in Field Manual 3-24 called for a focus on 
population security and winning hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. It is worth 
mentioning that although General Petraeus is often credited with being the only 
counterinsurgency military leader in Iraq, General George Casey, Petraus’s predecessor, 
did attempt to “contain insurgent violence, build up Iraqi Security Forces, rebuild 
economically, and reach out to the Sunni community through both coercion and 
cooperation” 157 three years earlier in 2004.    
154 Baker, J., Hamilton, L. (2005). The Iraq Study Group Report. U.S. Institute of Peace. Pg 32. 
155 Kagan, K. (2008) The Surge: A Military History. Pg 163-164 
156 Baker, J., Hamilton, L. (2005). The Iraq Study Group Report. U.S. Institute of Peace. Pg. 92 
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 COIN and the surge aimed to use the power of the U.S. military to win hearts and 
minds. Tens of thousands of additional coalition troops were deployed to Iraq in an 
attempt to ramp up this effort, and “clear and hold” the most violent areas. COIN and the 
surge also called for increased collaboration and cooperation with the local population. A 
group of Sunni tribal leaders, nicknamed the Sons of Iraq, reached out to the U.S. forces 
in an attempt to partner with coalition forces to fight extremism in their province, al 
Anbar. In return for the tribes working with U.S. and coalition forces, the U.S. provided 
tribal forces with some arms, training, and monetary compensation.  
 Counterinsurgency represented a revolutionary shift in traditional U.S. war 
fighting. Although the counterinsurgency movement within the Department of Defense 
opened the door to new opportunities and operational learning, it was met with significant 
institutional resistance.  The concept of using the military to achieve both “soft power” 
and “hard power” objectives that are necessary for counterinsurgency leans away from 
everything that traditional U.S. strategic culture represents. David Ucko writes: 
 “It did not help, of course, that the COIN community advanced a cause 
that was anathematic to the “American way of war,” significantly 
raising the barrier against its entry into the DoD mainstream… Through 
its culture and history the U.S. military was from the outset averse to 
these types of operations. This predisposition intensified with the Iraq 
campaign, which showcased the complexity and apparent intractability 
of counterinsurgency.”158 
  
 Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, which began in February 2007, exemplifies the 
strategic shift away from high intensity combat operations and implementation of 
counterinsurgency efforts on the ground; General Petraeus spearheaded these efforts. By 
this time, most units deployed to Iraq were well versed and educated on the 
158 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. 
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counterinsurgency principles. Ucko writes, “Soldiers participating in the Baghdad 
Security Plan were instructed to operate extensively on city streets rather than occupy 
fortified isolated bases; to provide security rather than strike individual targets; and to 
deploy in mass with an increased risk of U.S. casualties but with a higher likelihood of 
gaining support of a better-protected population.159 Although the implementation of these 
methods was in some ways problematic, the dramatic shift away from American 
historical tendencies and old think, represents a capacity for change in strategic culture at 
the strategic and operational level.  
 In his book The Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen praises Petraus’s efforts, 
writing “We successfully turned Iraq back from the brink of total disaster by applying a 
strategy of protecting the population, co-opting and winning over the irreconcilables, 
expanding the center of Iraqi politics, marginalizing the extremes, and eliminating the 
irreconcilables.”160 Although the origins of the measured reduction in violence during the 
period of the Surge continues to be debated, the evidence that there was a clear attempt 
by the U.S. armed forces to shift the U.S. approach to the conflict in Iraq on a strategic 
and operational level.   
  
Findings 
 There is evidence that the initial U.S. war plan for Iraq was significantly shaped 
by U.S. historical tendencies; the intelligence gathering and dissemination process, 
decision-making process to invade Iraq, the initial invasion strategy were all significantly 
159 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. 
Pg. 171 
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shaped by the 13 defining characteristics of the American way of war outlined earlier in 
this chapter.  
 The Kerr group report points out that although the intelligence community 
produced sound analysis on political and cultural projections in Iraq, short-sighted 
analysis that relied heavily on technical intelligence, selective dissemination, and 
preconceived anxieties about possible Iraqi intentions failed to provide policymakers with 
an objective, holistic estimate of the situation in Iraq. Subsequently, U.S. strategists and 
policymakers focused on the technical aspects of Iraqi air defense systems when forming 
policy. The Kerr report succinctly summarizes the politicized intelligence and strategic 
shortcomings regarding the 2003 invasion:   
“The national intelligence produced on the technical and 
cultural/political areas, however remained largely distinct and 
separate. Little or no attempt was made to examine or explain the 
impact of each area on the other. Thus, perspective and a 
comprehensive sense of understanding of the Iraqi target per se were 
lacking…. In an ironic twist, the policy community was receptive to 
technical intelligence (the weapons program), where the analysis was 
wrong, but apparently paid little attention to intelligence on cultural 
and political issues (post Saddam Iraq), where the analysis was 
right.”161        
 
 Although the Kerr report was distinctly reviewing the intelligence and policy 
failures relating the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the report brings to light an important 
observation regarding the impact of historical tendencies on policy and strategy in Iraq: 
American policy makers and military commanders overemphasized capabilities and 
collection via technology and were “culturally ignorant” when projecting the post 
Saddam strategic landscape.   
161 Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community. (2004). Kerr Group, Central 
Intelligence Agency. Pg. 2 
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 A focus on capabilities, and subsequent false assumptions about the enemy’s 
behavior based on capabilities, and overlooked domestic dynamics resulted in serious 
strategic blunders. In line with previous historical tendencies, the Bush administration 
planned for Iraq to be won in a regular, linear way, in which skeletal forces in Iraq would 
remove WMD from Iraq, overthrow Saddam, bestow democracy on Iraq, then leave the 
country in a stable, controlled condition. In a hearing before the House of 
Representatives, Paul Wolfowitz’s statement exposes the administration’s ahistorical, 
optimistic, aggressive and offensive, profoundly regular, and impatient initial plans for 
Iraq; he stated,  “The notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to 
provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq are wildly off the mark… it is hard to conceive that 
it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to 
conduct the war itself.”162 The idea that the U.S. would leave a “light footprint” and had 
“no interest in nation building” illustrates America’s strategic cultural impatience in 
conflict. As a whole, the initial invasion strategy relied exclusively on achieving the 
mission by profoundly regular means.  
 By 2004 it was clear that the former assumptions on which the existing strategy 
were built were completely wrong. Worse still, the domestic security situation in Iraq was 
steadily deteriorating. In his book Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change, 
Murray writes, “Successful innovation has depended on the organizational culture, the 
vision of senior leaders.”163 In the case of the Iraq war, innovation and the attempt to shift 
strategy was led by General Petraeus. Although the success of the surge and 
implementation of Petraeus’s COIN efforts are still debated, the doctrine outlined in FM 
162 Ricks, T. E. (2006). Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq. Pg. 98 
163 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 5 
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3-24 and its implementation on the ground in operations like Fardh al-Qanoon certainly 
indicates a huge shift away from the traditional American way of war. A focus on 
population security and increased engagement with the local population represent a shift 
away from U.S. historical tendencies to value force protection over population protection, 
take an aggressive and offensive approach, and heavily rely on firepower. Additionally, it 
should be mentioned that FM 3-24 was different than traditional field manuals, which 
usually focus on tactical operations at the brigade level, in that FM 3-24 provided more of 
an overview for counterinsurgency strategy; the idea was to shift the strategy starting 
from the highest levels, and have strategic goals operationalize at the tactical level of 
Army brigades and Marines on the ground. This did, in fact, happen — the 
implementation of COIN on the ground evidences the operational learning capacity of the 
U.S. armed forces.   
 A shift towards counterinsurgency at the institutional level, however, was lacking. 
The reasons for the inability of the U.S. military to adapt to irregular warfare at the 
institutional level appear to be rooted in the continued influence of old think and 
organizational culture, which Murray suggests is the first key to successful military 
innovation.164 David Ucko perfectly captures this phenomenon: 
 
 “Although the learning was in many ways impressive its 
manifestations have often been peripheral to DoD as a whole. As a 
result, the learning has not to date compelled a genuine acceptance of 
counterinsurgency as a U.S. military mission or a related reorientation 
of priorities and culture.”165 
 
The lack of adaptation at the institutional level is also evidenced in Pentagon documents 
and in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2006 QDR, like many other 
164 Murray, W. (2011). Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Pg. 5 




                                                        
 
DoD policy papers at the time, did little more than recognizing irregular warfare as a 
topic of concern. These documents were indicative of DoD’s preference to prioritize 
kinetic counterterrorism operations. 166  Colin Gray posits that many U.S. strategists 
continued to view the situation on the ground in Iraq as a set of problems, when it would 
have been more helpful to view the situation in Iraq as a set of conditions. However, the 
problem-solving spirit that is emblematic of U.S. strategic culture was ill prepared to be 
continuously challenged by a foe that “could not be brought to battle en masse, or be a 
problem solved tactically or operationally.” 167  
Conclusion  
 In his book on America’s strategic future, Van Tull wrote, “As the American 
national security establishment has become more professionalized, however, a tendency 
has developed to take inherent American strengths as a given and to proceed with 
strategic planning as an external process, looking outward toward the enemy without 
looking inward toward the nation’s politics and economics.” 168  This is certainly 
evidenced in the case of U.S. engagement in Iraq from 2003-2010. Ultimately, both the 
initial war strategy and counterinsurgency efforts were limited by deep-rooted, traditions 
regarding the American way of war. 
 Gray points out, “It is difficult to argue with a history that appears to validate the 
military merits of an offensive style.” 169 This is true, as the American way of war proved 
166 Ucko, D. (2009). The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars. 
Pg. 172 
167 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 33. 
168 Van Tuyll, H. (1998). America's strategic future: a blueprint for national survival in the new 
millennium.  
169 Gray, C. (2006). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Pg. 42 
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exceptional in many traditional conflicts in history. However it is important to be clear 
eyed about the America’s strategic future and growing involvement in counterinsurgency 
and irregular conflicts. The findings of this paper have shown that a strategy that ignores 
internal dynamics, sources of conflict, and population security is not a wise way of to 
engage in irregular war.  
 All of this is not to say that the U.S. should abandon conventional forces and 
capabilities. Rather, it would be beneficial for the U.S. military institution to be more 
aware of strategic biases resulting from entrenched norms, and figure out a way to 
address this so that the U.S. can effectively engage in counterinsurgency. 
 Moving forward, it is important to be clear-eyed about two realities. First, the 
American armed forces have been structured, trained, and equipped by a very specific set 
of strategic cultural norms for quite some time. Any change in norms or shift in strategic 
culture will require a significant investment in time and resources, and will be a gradual, 
likely generational shift.  Second, the Department of Defense is facing serious fiscal 
constraints, and providing what is essentially Special Forces training to the entire military 
is impossibly expensive. Nevertheless, it is imperative to the success of current and future 
counterinsurgency campaigns that the U.S. military is capable of going beyond traditional 
military means that focus on day to day tactical gains. An institutional view that 
genuinely considers counterinsurgency and stability operations to be worthy of a 
significant investment in training and resources is essential for the future U.S. 
engagement in counterinsurgency. During the release of the 2008 National Defense 




modernization will be sacrificed to fund asymmetric capabilities, but rather that in the 
future we will again neglect the latter.” 170  
  Since the U.S. withdrew troops from Iraq in 2010, there has been a hesitancy to 
reengage in counterinsurgency practices similar to those during 2006-2009 in Iraq. Even 
with the alarming proliferation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the U.S. has 
opted to rely heavily on airpower and SOF efforts to train and equip the indigenous 
forces. This shows yet another shift in strategy- however, the origins of this shift in 
strategy, and whether or not the military institution has adapted to give precedence to 
both the bomb and build portions of stability operations in the conflict is outside the 
bounds of this paper. It is still too early to tell if there has been a true institutional shift of 
U.S. strategy in the post Operation Iraqi Freedom but given the current fight against ISIL, 
this is a valuable topic for future research.  
 
FINAL CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this study is not to argue against the value of conventional military 
excellence. Rather, this study seeks to highlight that in counterinsurgency and stability 
operations, there are many non-lethal efforts and dynamics that must be heavily 
accounted for when engaging in irregular war.   
 As we saw in the cases of Syria versus The Muslim Brotherhood, Sri Lanka 
versus the Tamil Tigers, Nigeria versus and Islamic militants, military lines of effort and 
indiscriminate force alone can only produce temporary, tactical gains. In future 




                                                        
 
counterinsurgency operations, it will be important for policymakers and strategists to 
incorporate these lessons learned into future counterinsurgency strategy.  
The insight gained from the second chapter brings to light the fact that in Iraq, and 
environments like Iraq, local dynamics can shape larger outcomes. Insight from chapter 
illuminates that no matter how admirable foreign assistance efforts are from an outside 
party leading stability operations, it is critical to calibrate these efforts to local actors. If 
the U.S. wishes to engagement in counterinsurgency efforts in the future, especially in 
Iraq, it is critical to be clear-eyed about the limits of U.S. ability to shape the Iraqi 
priorities and deep-rooted differences. For this reason, working by-with-and-through 
local partners in all parts of Iraq should be a foremost consideration.  
The final assessment of U.S. strategy in Iraq and capacity to fight irregular wars 
reveals institutional challenges to be sure. However, by shedding light on institutional 
weaknesses and the negative impacts of old think and entrenched strategic norms, we are 
presented with an opportunity to confront weaknesses and improve U.S. capabilities to 
combat and defeat insurgents. Perhaps by viewing counterinsurgency as more of a “war 
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